The teats of the welfare state.
Gotabaya Rajapakse qualifications for Defense Secretary include being born and having a moustache. In his tenure he has lost control of Sri Lankan airspace, the police force in Colombo, and Karuna in the East. This former 7-11 Manager’s main qualification is his genetic link to the already thin Rajapakse intelligence. However, researchers have discovered that Mahinda’s prenatural smile is actually due to mental retardation. Gota is also, sadly, afflicted with congenital stupid. The man’s main talents are enriching himself, fucking up the country. He has recently learned how to dress by himself. Gota is also keeping his weight down better than Mahinda. Mahinda is already not the sharpest cookie in the shed, but to be subjected to this endless appointment of corrupt Rajapakses is just silly. Gotabaya Rajapakse has lost control of Sri Lankan airspace not once but twice. He has lost control of the East to the Karuna paramilitary. He has lost control of Colombo to mass abductions, including Muslim businessmen like the chairman of Hameedias. Gotabaya Rajapakse is a miserable failure and he should be sacked.
That is about all I have to say. This fish is rotting from the head. Corruption is endemic in the Police, Army and Government because corruption is endemic in the Rajapakse family. From the filthy SLT deal to the filthy arms contracts to the filthy Mihin Air deal, the Rajapakse clan is robbing the people of Sri Lanka at a time of war. Mahinda, the tsunami-hora, has not changed his stripes and Parliament must begin to check his imperial powers. We cannot win the war against the LTTE if the Rajapakse family steals all our money. We need money to fight a war, and we need to check these leaches before they bleed the nation dry. As a first step, Gotabaya Rajapakse should be pressured to resign.
At the very least there should be an embargo on Rajapakse family members in government, because their dad was beating them with the stupid stick.
u sad sad sad boys and girls.
if u only knew what really happens and what is happening!
bravo indi, this post shows u have figured out whats going on to a certain extent.
however, remember the old saying, fools go where angles fear to tread or something like that.
rest assured write whatever you want, but remember folks there is one person in sri lanka who will come after you with a vengence if you even dare to slag him remotely.
guess anyone?
ask indi. he’s figured it out! once again bravo!
at the end of the day its all for the sake of money, recognition & power. indi just make sure that others don’t use you for all of the previously mentioned. i am getting a sneaky suspicion you are. but once again, i respect your intelligence, you know it already and you need to take some action soon. which i know you will – soon.
all the best!
I assumed David Blacker is commenting on short term “success” here. I agree with his analyis within this frame of reference.
As you say, in the long term, it will depend on which party wearies of the war situation, or I might add, if the Sri Lankan government can getaway with large scale acts of genocide and compromise their credentials as a nation that is part of the global community.
What Sri Lankans fail to understand is that part of who “wins” or “loses” is dependent on who has the most to lose in the war. My answer to that is the Sinhalese in the South. The Tamils in the north/east or at least the LTTE, have pretty much nothing to lose (including any status in the eyes of the intenational community due to proscription). So they will be prepared to take greater risks.
The next generation of Rajapaksas enters the political arena from the Cinnamon Grand, witnessed by all three service chiefs (no wonder the war in unwinnable, these guys are never at the office): see write up and photo (black and white: why I wonder?) at http://saptha.com/blog/?p=138
“Well I’m no military expert but I thought the SLA was in a stronger position following the capture of Jaffna.”
I can’t really agree unless you indicate why you think so.
“Keeping up that pressure requires quite a lot of manpower, especially as more and more territory is captured. ”
Well, the south certainly has far more military-aged men available than the NE. Right now the MoD’s recruiting a fresh 50,000 men (which will apparently make SL’s Army larger than that of the UK!), and they have not even considered conscription or even dropping the age of recruitment to 17 (as it is in the UK), both of which will yield a massive intake. The LTTE on the other hand is scraping the barrel, conscripting women & children, with no relief in sight as the diaspora Tamils obviously aren’t interested in fighting. The LTTE’s also taking more casualties proportionately than the military, so the numbers are against them.
“Even then the LTTE can simply revert to guerilla warfare. Insurgencies can never be soundly defeated militarily. This is evident one looks at the histories of many other struggles. ”
While it’s true that the LTTE can prolong hostilities by reverting to guerrilla warfare as the main strategy (and it is one of the reasons why I and many others feel there cannot be a military solution), it can be weakened so badly that this guerrilla warfare will not be able to affect GoSL plans, particularly if the Tamil Nadu Tamils feel the cause is lost and support there dries up. Remember that a purely guerrilla force cannot maintain the infrastructural and financial base necessary to obtain regular arms shipments that will be needed to sustain the guerrilla fighting. Also, you are incorrect to say that insurgencies can never be defeated. The 20th century is replete with examples of this — the Malay Insurrection against the Brits in the ’50s, the Tibetan resistance to the Chinese, and our very own JVP. All were resoundingly defeated. What has been undefeatable is a PF army with safe haven and continuous popular support. Both of these two requirements can be wiped out if the LTTE is decisively defeated and its high command killed or captured (as was with the Malayans and the JVP).
“At that moment the Tigers will pounce not only in the northeast but in a dramatic manner in the south as well similar to KIA attacks to force the government to either ‘give in’ or agree to a ceasefire albeit temporarily. In such a situation the captured territories will become ‘borders’”
I’m afraid this is wishful thinking in the near future. In the last year or so the LTTE has been unable to carry out any successful missions in the south; even the most successful (the air attacks) had little or no military benefit. If you are talking about 10 or 15 years from now, yes, maybe. But the NE Tamil population cannot stand war that long. The entire social structure will break down, and even the survivors will be malnutritioned, illiterate, and scarred by war. Without a fresh influx into the gene pool there will be no chance. In the last 20 years the LTTE has been able to regualarly rock successive GoSLs with regular strategic attacks that damaged the administration’s public persona as successful military planners and leaders. Lately, the LTTE has successively proven its inability to do this. And there is no sign of a change in that trend.
“I can’t really agree unless you indicate why you think so.â€
I was thinking in sheer morale and the fact that the LTTE was on the run.
“What has been undefeatable is a PF army with safe haven and continuous popular support. Both of these two requirements can be wiped out if the LTTE is decisively defeated and its high command killed or captured (as was with the Malayans and the JVP).â€
Neither seems likely.
“Lately, the LTTE has successively proven its inability to do this. And there is no sign of a change in that trend.â€
In my opinion there is no trend per se, rather a lull. A lull to wait the International Community out politically…
“I was thinking in sheer morale and the fact that the LTTE was on the run”
Morale in the armed forces has never been higher than it is today, and the LTTE is as much on the run today as it was at the fall of Jaffna. I’m sure there was a spike immediately after the capture of Jaffna, but that is equivalent to Vakarai & Thoppigala.
“Neither seems likely”
Maybe not next month, but if the present military pressure is kept up over the next 6 months to a year, the LTTE will be weaker than it has ever been, and perhaps unable to regain the initiative.
“In my opinion there is no trend per se, rather a lull. A lull to wait the International Community out politically…”
I would agree with you if the LTTE Had made no attempt to carry out attacks in the south. Rather than the lull you suggest, what we have seen is a series of failed attacks (Gotabya assassination attempt, Fonseka assassination attempt, Galle harbour, KAFB air attack, Colombo air attack). Alll were either outright failiures or of extremely limited value. So to attribute these failures to some sort of far-sighted patience on the part of the LTTE politburo is wishful thinking. The only reason they’re trying wait on the IC is because everything else has failed.
You pathetic idiot, don’t use your time to write bullshit that you don’t know any shit of. Leaving SL when you were 3, no talk big. Get a life man. Try to get some info before you bark your mouth. FYI: Gota worked as a director for a law school in the USA – I work for the same school you idiot.
“I’m sure there was a spike immediately after the capture of Jaffna, but that is equivalent to Vakarai & Thoppigala.â€
Hmm I perceived it to be worth more…
“Maybe not next month, but if the present military pressure is kept up over the next 6 months to a year, the LTTE will be weaker than it has ever been, and perhaps unable to regain the initiative.â€
No matter how much weaker you perceive the LTTE, taking the Wanni heartland can never be a walk in the park.
“I would agree with you if the LTTE Had made no attempt to carry out attacks in the south. Rather than the lull you suggest, what we have seen is a series of failed attacks (Gotabya assassination attempt, Fonseka assassination attempt, Galle harbour, KAFB air attack, Colombo air attack). Alll were either outright failiures or of extremely limited value. So to attribute these failures to some sort of far-sighted patience on the part of the LTTE politburo is wishful thinking. The only reason they’re trying wait on the IC is because everything else has failed.â€
Nope those I just perceive as terrorist attacks in the south… their strategy per se evolves. I agree that most of them failed… but it was more bad luck on their part than lapse in operational capabilities.
They’ve yet to undertake a full scale offensive encompassing all their might. Of course some think the LTTE attempted an all out attack sometime August last year… but that’s open to interpretation, especially since the core veteran fighters weren’t involved in any of the battles. I think preparations are still underway in Jaffna…
“Hmm I perceived it to be worth more…”
Politically, and from a propogando viewpoint, yes. But from a strategic military viewpoint, Vakarai was much more of a victory because it was the final LTTE coastal area in the east.
“No matter how much weaker you perceive the LTTE, taking the Wanni heartland can never be a walk in the park.”
No one said it would be. The capture of Jaffna & Thoppigala, the defenses of Elephant Pass & Welioya, none of those are walks in the park either. Don’t underestimate the ruthlessness of this administration.
“Nope those I just perceive as terrorist attacks in the south… their strategy per se evolves.”
Now yoou’re just attempting to sit on the fence. You predicted strategic attacks in the south; I pointed out that all such recent attempts have failed. You need to come up with something better than an ambivalent comment that strategy evolves.
“but it was more bad luck on their part than lapse in operational capabilities.”
If you plan well, you ensure luck plays the smallest of factors. In the past the LTTE was consistently successful and occasionally unlucky. Now they’re consistently unsuccessful and occasionally lucky.
“They’ve yet to undertake a full scale offensive encompassing all their might.”
You’re speculating on that. The recent Omanthai counterattack in the Mannar/Vavuniya sector was a full force operation, which while mostly successful in retaking some captured areas, failed to prevent the Army’s strategic realignment of the frontline. It also failed to capture any of the fire support bases it targeted. The fact is that the LTTE is unable to consolidate in one place the forces necessary to punch through the Army line because of the overall pressure the military is maintaining across the NE from Thoppigala to Mannar.
FYI: Gota worked as a director for a law school in the USA
Methinks: credibility of that statement would be so much greater if the name of the law school was given.
I am sure the law school would be “honoured” to have ex-faculty as the Defense Minister.