Because Tamils (Hindus & Christians) harassed and killed them….and continue to do so.

Come off it, man. Are you saying regular claymore attacks, assassination of GoSL int agents, etc didn’t put the CFA in jeopardy? If so, it’s because the GoSL was patient and bided its time (in spite of public calls for action). Things escalated after Kadir’s murder; and the GoSL saw Karuna as a good proxy with which to hit back. And remember that the TMVP split off wasn’t instigated by the GoSL. It was a result of the LTTE’s opppression of its own people.

I said in a response earlier to Ravana that I don’t know when the first shot was fired after the CFA, but the ‘dirty’ covert war started after the defection in March 2004. There may have been killings earlier, but the escalation of violence towards a possible showdown occurred after the defection in mid and late 2004. Then the tsunami happened, there was a window of opportunity and with the SC decision things got worse again. There was a marked change in terms of attitude to negotiations displayed by the LTTE after these events and a resulting escalation in violence.

I’d also appreciate it if you could inform me of what actions of the LTTE were oppressive towards the Eastern Tamils. There was nothing from civil society actors, members of the international community, the GOSL, academics, the UTHR, Eastern Tamil politicians or Karuna about such supposed “oppression” before the Karuna defection. What I want to know is how this oppression went under the radar for so long and why no one talked about it. I mean absolutely no one! Strange, is it not?

It doesn’t matter exactly when, Aadhavan. Sure, things escalated after the split, mostly because the TMVP was fighting the LTTE openly and the GoSL then started using this as a screen for its own special ops. The point is the aggression by the LTTE had begun before the split; obviously it escalated afterwards, only natural.

I didn’t say that the LTTE was oppressive just to the Eastern Tamils, but to the NE Tamils as a whole. Are you asking me for evidence of that oppression? And do you seriously think that Karuna would’ve been allowed to live if he had started complaining loudly BEFORE the split about LTTE oppression of the Tamils?

There might have been isolated incidents of violence, but they were never really an issue and there was no open hostility. In fact, the Tiger military commanders and the army commanders used to meet periodically to discuss issues pertaining to the CFA. The kind of violence that really jeopardized the peace process and the shift in attitude of the LTTE away from the peace process occurred after the karuna split and the government’s support to karuna’s armed wing. Earlier, there was violence, but there was always the possibility that if and when the Kumaratunga government put forward its own proposals for interim administration of the NE, the peace process would take off from where it left. After the Karuna split that changed, until the PTOMS agreement was reached. We all knew what happened next.

I don’t think you’re going to be able to show that there was no shift in attitude towards the peace process from the LTTE after the karuna split and that the signs of war were already there before the split. That’s a bit of a stretch really. Also, i don;t know how you cannot accept that the knowledge that the GOSL were using Karuna to attack them would not have effectively caused the LTTE to close the door to negotiations unless and until that issue was addressed. I think everyone in the island knew that things just turned for the worse during 2004. Previously there was a lot of optimism among the people and even though there were a few incidents here and there, the vast majority of people were relatively confident that things would work out.

Karuna broke off claiming that the Eastern Tamils were being discriminated against. Also, where is the causal nexus between the oppression and the split. Assuming there was oppression, there is still no reason why that oppression should have caused one of the main culprits for that oppression to split from the main group no….?

I’m concerned that you are happy with the govt using karuna and vice versa. It seems to me like people never learn from the lessons history has taught them.

“There might have been isolated incidents of violence, but they were never really an issue and there was no open hostility. ”

If you mean there were no camps overrun or buses bombed, you’re right. There was no open hostility. Just a constand steady stream of assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and aggression. If you think this wasn’t an issue, try explaining that to the people who were killed and disappeaared during that period. Just because it seems minor in comparison to present day operations, doesn’t at all mean it was minor. It was quite serious at the time.

I’m not attempting to show that there was no change in attitude by the LTTE after the Karuna split. There certainly was. If before the split they were hooping to goad the GoSL into retaliating so that it could take the blame for renewed fighting, they abandoned that plan and began to operate more overtly. Obviously they thought that the GoSL had instigated the split.

Certainly the GoSL’s decision to support Karuna clearly pissed off Prabha, and the GoSL knew it. But I think if the LTTE went instead to the IC, opened up their territory fully to the media, etc, the GoSL would eventually have had to abandon Karuna or look like supporters of terror. The LTTE instead chose to up the ante and escalate the hostilities, giving the Mahinda & the Hawks the opportunity to legitimately retaliate. The Tigers then made it worse by concentrating ops on areas that severely affected civilians (like Muhamalai), making themselves look even more like terrorists. Strangely, this time the LTTE was unabblle to weigh the benefits of action against the consequences accurately as they’ve done in the past. A successful attack against a large security forces base would’ve rocked the GoSL sufficiently enough to make it rethink strategy. But the LTTE chickened out, not wanting to look like the aggressors in the eyes of the IC, choosing instead nickel and dime ops that it’s been beaten at while still looking like aggressors because of Kadir’s assassination, etc.

“Karuna broke off claiming that the Eastern Tamils were being discriminated against. Also, where is the causal nexus between the oppression and the split. Assuming there was oppression, there is still no reason why that oppression should have caused one of the main culprits for that oppression to split from the main group no….”

Yes, Karuna used the slogan of oppression of the Eastern Tamils. But it would not have been possible for him to split unless there was an overall oppression of the Tamils by the LTTE, just as it would not have been possible for the LTTE (and other groups) to revolt against the GoSL unless there was actual oppression of the Tamils by the GoSL. Why do you find it unnatural that someone who is part of an oppressive group can eventually be led by his conscience to rebel against that very group? How else do military coups d’etat occur?

I am not particularly happy about the GoSL using Karuna, Aadhavan. But things never come neatly packaged in war, my friend. And you fight with the weapons you have.

The question is not whether any violence is serious, but whether the violence pre Karuna defection placed the entire CFA in any real danger. You rely on the ‘try telling the victims its not serious’ argument. While that may suffice as a valid argument to suggest that any violence is morally repugnant, it really doesn’t prove that things were headed inevitably towards war pre March 2004. And everyone knows that things really started getting worse in 2004, so much so that it looked like war would break out early 2005.

“If before the split they were hooping to goad the GoSL into retaliating so that it could take the blame for renewed fighting, they abandoned that plan and began to operate more overtly.”

I think there’s some presumptuous speculation there. A)that the plan was to goad the army into fighting. It could have been a number of things that caused the violence. That the army themselves were being violent for instance. Also, the LTTE were very upset about the continued occupation of the HSZ’s and the fact that you try and maximize your advantage during peace. Nothing to prove that the “they always wanted war’ hypothesis is valid. B) that the plan to create war changed from goading to much more open hostilities. If you remember right, the initial hostilities were against the Karuna cadres who were driven out of LTTE controlled territory. When the breakaways were granted safe harbour with the govt in govt controlled territory, the violence directly involved the govt troops and the killings escalated on both sides. The tit for tat type. Again, your assumptions are wrong, or at best, just baseless speculation. There could just as well have been other causes to explain what happened besides “the LTTE always wanted a war after the ISGA was spurned” theory.

“But it would not have been possible for him to split unless there was an overall oppression of the Tamils by the LTTE.”

Er… why not? Once a group exists and is capable of fighting, why can’t a portion of it break off for reasons other than oppression of the group as a whole. Actually, rather than challenge the notion that the LTTE are the champions of Tamils’s rights, the split has established that all Tamil alternatives to the LTTE are either using the govt or being used by the govt. Still, you have not provided a causal nexus besides some faulty logic of “it couldn’t have happened without oppression.”

“Why do you find it unnatural that someone who is part of an oppressive group can eventually be led by his conscience to rebel against that very group?”

Probably because the ‘conscientious’ Karuna is carrying on the same kind of activity that he carried out when he was in the LTTE, and worse. Like recruiting child soldiers, abducting, killing, reigniting the Tamil-Muslim land dispute in Kattankudy and Arayampathy etc. If you claimed there was oppression of Karuna that caused the split, even in the absence of a causal nexus I might be tempted to buy it. But how the split is presumed to be caused by the general oppression of Tamils, I will never know unless you prove it David.

“The question is not whether any violence is serious, but whether the violence pre Karuna defection placed the entire CFA in any real danger.”

I think it did. The almost daily fire directed over and at Army FDLs and checkpoints were certainly done to trigger retaliation and escalaation. It sure wasn’t target practice. To say things were not headed ‘inevitably’ towards war at that time is true. But the same can be said about the period after the TMVP/LTTE split, and even today, in fact. It’s always possible to step back. But if you want peace you don’t purposely put strains on the peace process for negligable gains. Yes, things got worse in 2004, but it reached that stage because of what had happened before.

“I think there’s some presumptuous speculation there. A)that the plan was to goad the army into fighting.”

As I’ve pointed out, firing at Army FDLs and checkpoints was goading. What the LTTE was upset about is immaterial. There are many things both sides were upset about, but shooting at soldiers is usually a bad idea if peace is on your agenda. The LTTE also used the CFA to target GoSL int agents. This was highly provocative, and myself was quite surprised that the Army didn’t retaliate immediately to the loss of these assets.

” B) that the plan to create war changed from goading to much more open hostilities”

Again, I didn’t say they wanted open war. But the LTTE certainly didn’t want absolute peace. They wanted to spur some retaliatory operations from the Army so that an excuse could be found to overrun a major base like China Bay even temporarily in order to gain cards at the table and sustain the threat of the Sinhalese on the Tamil population.

“There could just as well have been other causes to explain what happened besides “the LTTE always wanted a war after the ISGA was spurned” theory.”

What are these causes?

“Once a group exists and is capable of fighting, why can’t a portion of it break off for reasons other than oppression of the group as a whole.”

Because of the fish in the sea scenario. A group cannot exist without a certain amount of popular support. Arms alone cannot guarantee that support. The support is extended for certain reasons. If you feel therre are other reasons why the Eastern Tamils support the TMVP, I’d like to hear them.

“Actually, rather than challenge the notion that the LTTE are the champions of Tamils’s rights, the split has established that all Tamil alternatives to the LTTE are either using the govt or being used by the govt. ”

Quite the opposite in fact. It’s proven that the only way a voice opposed to the LTTE can survive being wiped out is when it is given protection by the GoSL. It also gave the lie to the LTTE claim that all NE Tamils don’t see the GoSL as the legit govt. If the LTTE wasn’t a terrorist group, its opponents wouldn’t require help. Remember the other separatist groups that didn’t ally themselves with the GoSL in the late ’80s? Neither do I, because they were wiped out 15 years ago.

“Probably because the ‘conscientious’ Karuna is carrying on the same kind of activity that he carried out when he was in the LTTE, and worse”

Again, you’re assuming that because I’ve forwarded a possibility, it’s the only one. There maybe other reasons why the oppression of the Tamils caused Karuna to revolt. I don’t know what they are, but if there’s one possibility there could well be others.

“But how the split is presumed to be caused by the general oppression of Tamils, I will never know unless you prove it David.”

What would you consider proof?

After the split, things were ‘inevitably’ headed towards war, because the LTTE said that unless Karuna was disarmed negotiations would not proceed. They even said that discussion of ISGA alone would not bring them back to discussing substantive issues until karuna was disarmed. Since the govt was not going to disarm Karuna, the inevitability of war became a reality at that time. Not before.

“The LTTE also used the CFA to target GoSL int agents. This was highly provocative, and myself was quite surprised that the Army didn’t retaliate immediately to the loss of these assets.”

Exactly, maybe the LTTE knew a thing or two about your own govt and military that you didn’t, which was that the GOSL was not inclined to go to war despite these activities of the LTTE. If you can get away with it under the cover of the CFA and not face retaliation, why not? As you point out, it’s a dirty game right.

“A group cannot exist without a certain amount of popular support. Arms alone cannot guarantee that support.”

The EPDP exists and flourishes with very very little support. It’s not arms alone, but safe haven that is given to Karuna by the govt. Popular support is probably needed for a group in its nascent stages that is seeking to militarize. Karuna already had the fighting capacity and the expertise. You add govt protection, arms, help with the conscription of kids and the turning of a blind eye to all of your atrocities and popular support kind of becomes dispensable.

“Again, you’re assuming that because I’ve forwarded a possibility, it’s the only one. There maybe other reasons why the oppression of the Tamils caused Karuna to revolt.”

What do you mean. You said the LTTE was oppressive to Tamils and that’s why Karuna revolted. I said that’s nonsense given that Karuna is equally oppressive. If there are other mysterious reasons, then your point is mere speculation and guesswork.

“What would you consider proof?”

Can’t articulate what standard o proof. probably preponderance of probability but certainly something better than speculation and empty guesswork David.

“After the split, things were ‘inevitably’ headed towards war, because the LTTE said that unless Karuna was disarmed negotiations would not proceed.”

Exactly. The LTTE brought in a new condition (outside the CFA) as a condition for peace. Even if the GoSL wasn’t supporting the TMVP, it wasn’t incumbent on it to disarm it either. Just as the GoSL was self-disciplined enough to ignore the aggression of the LTTE, the latter should have been mature enough to overlook this. Instead, they retaliated, and have now (with the loss of Vakarai yesterday) virtually lost the Eastern Province, but withh great loss of civilian life, for which they should shoulder the blame. If they are the reps of the Tamils, they have failed them miserably.

“After the split, things were ‘inevitably’ headed towards war, because the LTTE said that unless Karuna was disarmed negotiations would not proceed.”

So you’re saying because it was a successful strategy, it was therefore the correct one? I might as well say the same vis a vis the GoSL and the TMVP. The GoSL has succeeded in pushing the LTTE out of the East, and will very well congratulatte itself on deciding to back Karuna.

“The EPDP exists and flourishes with very very little support.”

The EPDP may exist, but it certainly doesn’t flourish.

“It’s not arms alone, but safe haven that is given to Karuna by the govt. Popular support is probably needed for a group in its nascent stages that is seeking to militarize. Karuna already had the fighting capacity and the expertise. You add govt protection, arms, help with the conscription of kids and the turning of a blind eye to all of your atrocities and popular support kind of becomes dispensable.”

Well, that’s exactly what India did for the LTTE right upto ’87. But the LTTE still could not exist without popular supporrt, as it cannot even today. A fish out of water doesn’t last long, no matter who protects it. A clear example was the TNA in ’89-’90. It had Indian support and lostical supply, but no popular support. The LTTE and the Army crushed them in months.

“What do you mean. You said the LTTE was oppressive to Tamils and that’s why Karuna revolted.”

What I meant was that there might have been outher possibilities beyond conscience to make Karuna revolt. For instance, he might have seen the oppression as a convenient slogan around which to rally support. I’m not insisting that the LTTE is significantly more oppressive to the Eastern Tamils, but that it is oppressive to the NE Tamils in general (extortion, child recruitment, conscription, etc). There are however indications of that extra oppression (though I don’t know if it will satisfy your demand for probable cause). I was talking to a young woman from Batti in the mid-’90s, and she said that was a noticeable difference in the treatment of local civilians (both Tamil and Muslim) by Northern LTTEers as oppposed to Eastern LTTEers. The latter were less harsh. Also, IDPs coming out of Vakarai have said that whenever there was some relaxation in the LTTE’s hold over them, it was because of the presence of Eastern Province LTTEers.

Sorry, should’ve read:

“Exactly, maybe the LTTE knew a thing or two about your own govt and military that you didn’t, which was that the GOSL was not inclined to go to war despite these activities of the LTTE.”

So you’re saying because it was a successful strategy, it was therefore the correct one? I might as well say the same vis a vis the GoSL and the TMVP. The GoSL has succeeded in pushing the LTTE out of the East, and will very well congratulatte itself on deciding to back Karuna.

“Exactly. The LTTE brought in a new condition (outside the CFA) as a condition for peace.”

Exactly. There were no conditions for peace talks before the Karuna split, which was one of my arguments to show that the Karuna split and govt support to Karuna was the real cause for the irreversible trend of violence that resulted in the war.

“Even if the GoSL wasn’t supporting the TMVP, it wasn’t incumbent on it to disarm it either.”

But it was supporting, and so it was under obligation to at least stop that support.

“Just as the GoSL was self-disciplined enough to ignore the aggression of the LTTE, the latter should have been mature enough to overlook this.”

Maybe the Tigers were immature, maybe they were being cautious about not letting the paramilitaries inflict too much harm on them while their hand were tied. Still the point that the split and subsequent govt support caused the war doesn’t change.

“So you’re saying because it was a successful strategy, it was therefore the correct one?”

What? Read my comments again. Where did I ever say any strategy was successful or correct. I said that the Tigers decided not to negotiate further under the CFA while Karuna was still being propped up by the govt, and that the split and subsequent support changed their approach from one that was satisfied with status quo to one that was deeply unhappy about the ‘dirty war’ between the LTTE and govt propped paramilitaries.

“Well, that’s exactly what India did for the LTTE right upto ‘87. But the LTTE still could not exist without popular supporrt, as it cannot even today.”

All that example proves at most is that the LTTE benefited from popular support. Not that popular support was indispensable. Even by your own argument, Karuna’s cadres havne’t really fulfilled the test because they have not been a sustained military force for long. Also, the TNA was crushed because the LTTE and the Army were after it. Surprise, surprise!! The point is that Karuna has incredible support from the govt and would have been crushed by the LTTE unless the govt gave him safe haven. Where does popular support become a necessity for survival for a group that already has a formidable fighting machine and substantial access to information about the enemy.

“For instance, he might have seen the oppression as a convenient slogan around which to rally support.”

Which means that the actual cause was something else right? That’s kind of my point. Actually Karuna used the North v East issue as the convenient slogan, and not some general oppressive attitude of the LTTE.

“There are however indications of that extra oppression (though I don’t know if it will satisfy your demand for probable cause).”

You read my mind. But you know those stories of yours don’t fulfill anyone’s test for probable cause, since earlier on you yourself denied that you had suggested that there was some special kind of oppression dealt out to Eastern Tamils.

“Exactly. There were no conditions for peace talks before the Karuna split”

Wrong, Aadhavan. There were. The ISGA. The rejection of it started the first violence by the LTTE. Now, before you fall back on your excuse that is therefore the GoSL’s fault for rejecting the ISGA and causing the war, let me remind you of my original point was that the LTTE didn’t have the patience required of diplomacy.

“the Karuna split and govt support to Karuna was the real cause for the irreversible trend of violence that resulted in the war”

Again, you’re ignoring the point that the hostilities had begun BEFORE the Karuna split (assassination, disappearances, attacks on Army positions, etc). If there had been none before, you could forward that premise. Without doubt, the GoSL support for the TMVP escalated the hostilities (just as the LTTE did at Sampur), but it didn’t start the violence.

“But it was supporting, and so it was under obligation to at least stop that support.”

Not at all. There is nothing in the CFA about the GoSL having to disarm LTTE splinter factions. Just as the GoSL gives safe harbour to other anti-LTTE groups, it’s quite free to do so with the TMVP. You can argue that this is not in the spirit of the CFA, and you’d be right. But then neither are the assassinations and ambushes by the LTTE. What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. It seems a pity that you seem to be left with apologising for the LTTE’s inability to win at its own game by hiding behind the letter of a law that the LTTE is flaunting.

“Still the point that the split and subsequent govt support caused the war doesn’t change.”

I’m afraid it does, because it was the LTTE aggression that probably made the GoSL look at alternate ways to hit back.

““So you’re saying because it was a successful strategy, it was therefore the correct one?”

What? Read my comments again. Where did I ever say any strategy was successful or correct.”

I had posted that in response to your comment that the LTTE judged that the Army would not retaliate against its aggression, and therefore it was OK to do so because it didn’t threaten the CFA. I think it’s YOU who need to read my posts before responding. You’re barking up the wrong palmyrah.

“All that example proves at most is that the LTTE benefited from popular support. Not that popular support was indispensable.”

If you feel that popular support is dispensable for a guerrilla/PF movent, all I can tell you is that you’re wrong and to read up on military history.

“The point is that Karuna has incredible support from the govt and would have been crushed by the LTTE unless the govt gave him safe haven.”

Just as the LTTE (and other separatist groups) would have been crushed by the GoSL (and practically were in Op Liberation in ’87) if not for the “incredible support” of India. So what’s your point? What I’m trying to make clear to you Aadhavan, is that popular support + safe haven = success. Take away either and you don’t have success. The JVP/DJV is a clear example. They had the support but no haven. The TNA is another. They had the safe haven but no support. There are even more examples if you look outside SL.

“Where does popular support become a necessity for survival for a group that already has a formidable fighting machine ”

I’m sure the TMVP would be flattered by your compliments, but I’d drop formidable out of the equation. They aren’t formidable as a fighting machine (because they’re too small). They’re, however, a guerrilla unit trained and experienced in LTTE policy and tactics, manned by Tamils. That makes them a tool the GoSL has never had before. In other words, tame Tigers. However powerful one is militarily, one needs the sea if one is to remain a fish (a gurrilla/PF group).

“Which means that the actual cause was something else right? That’s kind of my point.”

Wrong. Again. Aadhavan, I’m disappointed that you find it neccessary to twist my words in order to gain a few points in the debate, rather than honestly look at the subject. I said he might’ve used the oppression of the Eastern Tamils as a convenient flag to rally behind. But that flag has to exist for him to do it. For example, Hitler used the national hatred and fear of the Jews and Communism as a flag beneath which to rally, but that fear and hatred DID exist. I’m sorry to have to give history lessons here, but you seem determined to ignore political reality.

“But you know those stories of yours don’t fulfill anyone’s test for probable cause, since earlier on you yourself denied that you had suggested that there was some special kind of oppression dealt out to Eastern Tamils. ”

Tsk, tsk, Aadhavan. I said no such thing. Please don’t resort to falsifying my comments in order to find an easy way of arguing. You might remember, that I started by saying that the LTTE was oppressive to ALL the NE Tamils. I asked you if you denied that, and you ignored that question conveniently. I said that it was that oppression that made it easy for Karuna to revolt. I then forwarded the theory that the LTTE was more oppressive to the Eastern Tamils than the Tamils in general. I gave you anecdotes since you asked for a probable cause. If you wish to have irrefutable evidence (smacks of Sittingnut here), then I can’t help you.

I know you posted similar thoughts in another response, but I can’t find it now, so I’ll answer here:

You asked if Karuna would settle for being “merely” a PC minister (de facto leader of the East). I don’t know, but I’d estimate he would. You’ve asked whether the Eastern Muslims would accept him. Again, I don’t know, but I’d estimate they would if he cleans up his act and the GoSL presses him do so; which they will once the immediate threat of the LTTE is taken care of.

“There were no conditions for peace talks before the Karuna split”
Wrong, Aadhavan. There were. The ISGA”

That’s one of the lies that’s spread around by govt apologists and I’m sad you’ve bought it without actually checking it up. Anyways, care to post a link where the LTTE said that acceptance of ISGA was a condition for peace. The LTTE never made the acceptance of the ISGA the condition for talks. They were willing to hear and discuss the govt counter proposals on the interim administrative measures in the NE for the handling of the humanitarian needs of the people there.

That proves my argument that it was only after the split and govt support to Karuna that the LTTE for the first time laid down conditions, i.e- let us deal with them, don’t harbour them while supporting their activities against us. There was no way the govt was going to accept this condition, and so war was inevitable. Earlier, no conditions that the govt was unlikely to fulfill, so no inevitable war. It’s fairly simple really…. The acts of violence and breaches were there earlier also, but ike you said, the govt didn’t respond proportionately and the peace process was never inevitably headed towards war.

“There is nothing in the CFA about the GoSL having to disarm LTTE splinter factions.”

I agree completely. The govt can give safe haven to anyone they want and it’s arguable that it would have been against the spirit of the CFA to protect him. The problem was that the govt was giving Karuna safe haven for Karuna to attack the LTTE and conduct operations against it. It was supporting Karuna to attack the LTTE. Let me know if you think this kind of thing isn’t covered by the CFA. I’m pretty sure facilitating armed violence and hostile action is covered in the CFA David. I’ll point it out if you contend with this point.

“What I’m trying to make clear to you Aadhavan, is that popular support + safe haven = success.”

As I’ve said, you need popular support in the nascent stages when you seek to become larger and more powerful. Karuna is already capable. You point out that his force is too small. Perfect, then this existence of a small potent force that knows the enemy inside out really doesn’t need to attribute it’s size or strength to popular support does it? Especially when it has a lot of support from the major military force that is on the ground where it operates. I maybe tempted to buy your theory if the Karuna cadres operate successfully in areas that are not controlled by the govt. Then you might need popular support to survive and succeed. Not when your military camp is next door to the STF camp. All you need for the kind of success he has had is an inside out knowledge of the LTTE, good, (small body of) effective cadres and plenty of support from the govt military. He has all these things without even requiring popular support.

“I’m disappointed that you find it neccessary to twist my words in order to gain a few points in the debate, rather than honestly look at the subject. I said he might’ve used the oppression of the Eastern Tamils as a convenient flag to rally behind. But that flag has to exist for him to do it.”

Look David, I think you’ve got to decide what the slogan was. The slogan was “oppression towards Eastern Tamils by Northern LTTE right. Your own argument is – the “flag” has to exist for you to use it. So, by that argument, credible proof must be given of real oppression of the North v East type right. But you claimed earlier and I quote you “I didn’t say that the LTTE was oppressive just to the Eastern Tamils, but to the NE Tamils as a whole” also “I’m not insisting that the LTTE is significantly more oppressive to the Eastern Tamils…” You only put forward the idea that the LTTE was generally oppressive to all Tamils and slinked out of really proving specific oppression against Easterners, bar one or two unsupported anecdotes. But the slogan of Karuna, and your assertion don’t correlate. If the flag has to exist, then you can’t use some general oppression as the “flag” or “cause” or “rallying cry” for the existence of specific oppression against the Easterners right. It would be the wrong flag.

“I said that it was that oppression that made it easy for Karuna to revolt.”

No. I think you’re trying to subtly change your story. You said “And remember that the TMVP split off wasn’t instigated by the GoSL. It was a result of the LTTE’s opppression of its own people.” Seems to me like you were talking about the central cause or the principal reason, and not merely some compounding factor that made it easier. I don’t agree that oppression was the cause for the split. Whether it assisted Karuna is another debate.

“I then forwarded the theory that the LTTE was more oppressive to the Eastern Tamils than the Tamils in general. I gave you anecdotes since you asked for a probable cause. If you wish to have irrefutable evidence (smacks of Sittingnut here), then I can’t help you.”

I don’t need irrefutable evidence. I just need you to explain to me why there was not even a murmur about this kind of specific oppression from anyone? None of the people who regularly critique the LTTE even suggested this type of thing. I made the point earlier and you ignored it. If this oppression existed, how come we never heard about it from people who are more than willing to find fault with the LTTE. Even the govt didn’t suggest that such a thing existed. I’m not looking for irrefutable evidence but the existence of some sort of ‘chat’ about this before the split. If nothing of the sort even existed, it’s more likely that it was made up.

“You asked if Karuna would settle for being “merely” a PC minister (de facto leader of the East). I don’t know, but I’d estimate he would.”

A PC Minister would not be the defacto head of a Province. Read up on your 13th Amendment. The Chief Minister is just head of govt and not even the head of the executive. That’s the Governor, who holds office at the will of the President. So the CM is really powerless to do anything, besides tabling bills for the PC to pass and assisting the Governor is appointing other PC Ministers. hardly the kind of job someone like Karuna, who is indispensable to the military fortunes of the govt would accept.

But you fail to understand that if the LTTE are weakened more and more by the govt with the help of Karuna, he will only get stronger and stronger. The more the govt helps him recruit kids, the bigger and bigger he’ll get, and the more the govt allows him to get away with all the extortion and kidnappings, the richer and richer he’ll get. If you think at that stage he can be disposed of quietly, you’re living in nevereverland. Just like the Indians and Premadasa were, when they thought that the LTTE could be ‘disarmed’ neatly whenever it suited them.

“That’s one of the lies that’s spread around by govt apologists and I’m sad you’ve bought it without actually checking it up. Anyways, care to post a link where the LTTE said that acceptance of ISGA was a condition for peace.”

Come, come, Aadhavan. We’ve discussed policy before, and we’ve both agreed that a policy doesn’t have to be written down or stated to be one. As Ravana posted on the economic side of it, the GoSL was happy to maintain the status quo; and part of that status quo was not acceding to new agreements or deals. So they rejected the ISGA, the LTTE was miffed and began to use military pressure. That didn’t work, and in fact just made things worse for the Tamil population. The latter then began to grumble, resulting in the LTTE clamping down on the locals. This then gave Karuna the opportunity to split. The GoSL then saw this as a heaven-sent opportunity to hit back at the LTTE undr the cover of the TMVP.

“The acts of violence and breaches were there earlier also, but ike you said, the govt didn’t respond proportionately and the peace process was never inevitably headed towards war.”

My point exactly. The GoSL’s patience prevented a return to war in spite of the LTTE’s attempt to escalate hostilities.

“The problem was that the govt was giving Karuna safe haven for Karuna to attack the LTTE and conduct operations against it. It was supporting Karuna to attack the LTTE.”

No, the problem was that the LTTE was attempting to escalate hostilities, and attempting to blame the Army for it by actively goading it into retaliating. Instead of doing the obvious and hitting back, the GoSL went round the back with the TMVP. Tit for tat. The LTTE then lost all patience and in frustration reverted back to terrorism by topping Kadir, etc. The LTTE was beaten at its own game.

“As I’ve said, you need popular support in the nascent stages when you seek to become larger and more powerful. Karuna is already capable.”

Please have at least a passing look at military history, Aadhavan, before going down this silly route. I might as well argue that the earth is flat and try to rationalize that (we don’t fall off, etc). Military strength alone can never win a popular war. For that you need popular support. If all you need is military capability, the Yanks would have won in Vietnam, and the Soviets in Afghanistan, India would’ve cleaned up J&K, and the GoSL would have control of the NE. Please, machang, don’t be ridiculous.

” I maybe tempted to buy your theory if the Karuna cadres operate successfully in areas that are not controlled by the govt. Then you might need popular support to survive and succeed. ”

You need popular support to operate anywhere that there is a civil population. The TMVP is operating MOSTLY in GoSL territory, but not only, just as the Army is operating MOSTLY in GoSL territory. Both the Army and the TMVP are carrying out recce and sabotage operations in LTTE territory.

“Look David, I think you’ve got to decide what the slogan was.”

Aadhavan, it’s possible that you’re misunderstanding my terminology. I think you assumed that I was being cynical when I used the term “slogan”. I wasn’t saying convenient = false. And if you go back and look at my posts I said that oppression of the Tamils made it possible for the TMVP to split. Specifically, oppression of the Eastern Tamils, but Tamils in general. If Karuna had been a northerner, he probably would’ve used the general oppression as a slogan instead of the specific one. I cannot give you evidence of that oppression, except anecdotes, for the simple reason that I’m an individual citizen and don’t have access to such evidence that you demand. I can only give you personal anecdotes. If you therefore feel I cannot prove my argument sufficiently, I’ll have to concede that. But my point was that the LTTE oppresses the Tamil population, and that oppression made it possible for Karuna to split.

“If the flag has to exist, then you can’t use some general oppression as the “flag” or “cause” or “rallying cry” for the existence of specific oppression against the Easterners right. It would be the wrong flag.”

It would be the wrong flag if there was no popular support for that slogan. People HAVE rallied beneath that flag, so it’s obviously the right one.

” I don’t agree that oppression was the cause for the split. Whether it assisted Karuna is another debate.”

I never said it was the cause of the split. I said it would not have been possible without it. To reiterate, he used the oppression as a cause. If the oppression didn’t exist, he couldn’t have used it. The LTTE uses the GoSL’s oppression of the Tamils as a cause. If that oppression didn’t exist, they couldn’t use it either. Whether the flag of oppression is the real reason for the LTTE’s and the TMVP’s existence, or whether there is another (or others) is a separate subject.

“I don’t need irrefutable evidence. I just need you to explain to me why there was not even a murmur about this kind of specific oppression from anyone? None of the people who regularly critique the LTTE even suggested this type of thing. I made the point earlier and you ignored it.”

I honestly don’t know why. Maybe it was suppressed. Maybe the people who do criticize the LTTE didn’t recognise that oppression as a specific one. Are there many Tamil sites discussing LTTE oppression of the Tamils?

“A PC Minister would not be the defacto head of a Province. Read up on your 13th Amendment. The Chief Minister is just head of govt and not even the head of the executive. That’s the Governor, who holds office at the will of the President”

Oh, I’m sure they’d make it possible for him to have control. Make him governer, even. See, in the end, the GoSL and the Sinhalese will accept a TMVP-led East rather than an LTTE/TNA-led one. Karuna may not be much better than Prabha, but it will save face and look like a victory for unitarians. The Eastern Tamils will accept the TMVP because they’ll finally have self-governance. The Muslims will also accept it because a Tamil-controlled East won’t be worse than a Sinhalese-controlled one. Karuna already has Muslims in the TMVP, and he’ll probably add to this number to strengthen his hand.

“But you fail to understand that if the LTTE are weakened more and more by the govt with the help of Karuna, he will only get stronger and stronger.”

I haven’t failed to see it, Aadhavan. But I think Karuna is smart enough to keep the GoSL onside even after he’s in charge of the East. Especially if he’s got Prabha Aiya up north wanting to move back in. I think the GoSL thinks it can keep the balance, or at least convince Karuna he’ll always need the central government. At some point, the GoSL will set up Tamil regiments into which the TMVP troops will be incorporated. Sinhalese liason, operations and int officers will rotate through these regimants and the bulk of the Sinhalese regular units will be withdrawn from the East. The East will have the self-governance it always wanted, and the GoSl would’ve saved face. Peace for the Eastern Tamils, dignity for the Sinhalese. The LTTE could’ve done this if it had stayed the course.

“Come, come, Aadhavan. We’ve discussed policy before, and we’ve both agreed that a policy doesn’t have to be written down or stated to be one.”

Er…David, if you are in negotiations with someone, and you want to lay down conditions for further negotiation, it’s kind of the normal thing to inform the other party that there are conditions and spell them out. You don’t have unstated conditions to talks…that’s ridiculous. The LTTE informed the govt that they have put forward a proposal and are willing to hear the govt’s alternative proposals and their ideas about how to go about reconstruction in the NorthEast. If they had conditions for talks, they really really would have informed the govt David.

“As Ravana posted on the economic side of it, the GoSL was happy to maintain the status quo; and part of that status quo was not acceding to new agreements or deals.”

Does this mean that the Govt wasn’t interested in rebuilding the NE during the ceasefire or making a deal to share power with the Tamils. The whole point of the ceasefire was to create the conditions for new deals and agreements to be made and implemented. if the govt wasn’t interested, then it’s not surprising that war ensued.

“So they rejected the ISGA, the LTTE was miffed and began to use military pressure. That didn’t work, and in fact just made things worse for the Tamil population. The latter then began to grumble, resulting in the LTTE clamping down on the locals. This then gave Karuna the opportunity to split”

The causal links there are a bit dodge. If the govt didn’t respond militarily how did things get substantially worse for the Tamils in the NE compared to pre-November ’03. It also seems like you’re speculating that the people began to grumble in the period after the ISGA was refused, and that the LTTE clamped down on them. There’s not a shred of evidence of this (i’m not asking for irrefuatble evidence again- but you don’t have a shred)

I’ve told you that the LTTE for the first time laid down non-negotiable conditions that the govt was not inclined to accept after the Karuna split and the conditions were that the govt stops using Karuna against the LTTE. The fact that conditions were laid that the govt was not willing to accept sealed the fate of the CFA. Until the tsunami, deal was made, SC scuttled it, back to previous situation describe in previous sentence.

“No, the problem was that the LTTE was attempting to escalate hostilities, and attempting to blame the Army for it by actively goading it into retaliating. Instead of doing the obvious and hitting back, the GoSL went round the back with the TMVP. Tit for tat.”

So the LTTE stepped up the violence between Nov 03 and March 04(when karuna defected). How did you come to this conclusion? What were these incidents? I know of one or two that occurred in 03, but they were before the ISGA proposal were even made. Your entire thesis is contingent on proving that the LTTE intensified the violence after the ISGA was refused, and before the govt responded by hitting back with karuna, so I’d like to know what these incidents are.

“Military strength alone can never win a popular war. For that you need popular support.”

So even by your own test, Karuna has to “win” the “popular war” – whatever you mean by “popular war”. Has Karuna won any war? It’s much easier to ascribe the military success of Karuna+army to the fact that the army now has in addition to their potent weapons and superior numbers, a group of guys who know the enemy like the back of their hand. You didn’t respond to my argument that you do not need to account for either Karuna’s size or ability by having recourse to the explanation of popular support. You only say you need popular support to win a war. That refrain really doesn’t address the specific situation here, given that it seems like Karuna has tipped the balance in the govt’s favour, and not “won the war”.

Again your examples only prove that it’s difficult for a major military power to rout a smaller group with tremendous popular support. The major military power here is the army and Karuna is under their wing, so what’s your point?

“People HAVE rallied beneath that flag, so it’s obviously the right one.”

That’s just a circular argument right. Your only evidence of people rallying under the flag is the fact that the Karuna split based on that flag. When I tell you that the flag(specific oppression) doesn’t exist and so the split must have been due to some other reason, you say that people have rallied under that flag!

“And if you go back and look at my posts I said that oppression of the Tamils made it possible for the TMVP to split.”

Well you were the one who initially claimed that the split was not govt instigated, it was the result of the LTTE’s oppression. It seemed to me like the attributing of one answer excluded the other. Now it turns out that the oppression was one of the factors that made the split possible. I can name a few other factors that also caused the split – Karuna was an astute commander who felt confident he would have had a better future outside the LTTE than within, he was given a lot of autonomy and built up a name for himself, he was under investigation by the LTTE etc etc. Under your thesis, it is still possible that the SL govt or India instigated it right.

If we are merely discussing contributing factors and not central cause, I’m sorry, I never intended to debate that.

“I honestly don’t know why. Maybe it was suppressed. Maybe the people who do criticize the LTTE didn’t recognise that oppression as a specific one. Are there many Tamil sites discussing LTTE oppression of the Tamils?”

That’s just a cop out. I don’t know about sites, but i’m fairly sure that if the LTTE was oppressive to a massive portion of the people under its control, there would have been more than a few people who would have raised the issue, especially if the people recognized such oppression. The absence of even a murmur suggests that this oppression really didn’t exist.

“The LTTE could’ve done this if it had stayed the course.”

Probably not right, given that the govt needed Karuna only to attack the LTTE. In any case, if the govt didn’t want to make deals. then this could never have happened.

“Oh, I’m sure they’d make it possible for him to have control.”

Yeah, they’d have to cede control. If there are however political problems with giving away an entire Province to a former LTTE cadre and Tamil militant, then there’d be a bit of a problem. The unitarists won’t be happy, why don’t you ask a few of them about it? Either way, if the govt is just speeding up autonomy and a free hand over the control of governance of the Sinhalese and Muslims and the military in the East to Tamils, that’s not entirely bad. I doubt they’ll concede, and I doubt Karuna will settle for anything less.

The critical question is whether the Sinhalese majority are willing to grant control of Tamil areas to Tamils and share power without pulling the strings. If they are willing, your prediction will come to pass, and not only that, they will agree to grant substantial autonomy for the North also. If they are unwilling to cede power, they will be unwilling to cede power to Karuna either, and we’re back at square one.

“Er…David, if you are in negotiations with someone, and you want to lay down conditions for further negotiation, it’s kind of the normal thing to inform the other party that there are conditions and spell them out.”

Not at all. If only that were true. The LTTE has often attempted to complicate negotiations with no clearly stated policy change. One of these trends is that of never negotiating with the same executive administration twice. Why’s that? It would facilitate negotiations to have aa consistent team. Therefore, if you’re saying it’s logical that the LTTE would inform the GoSL of a new condition, that logic doesn’t apply. Also, the CFA stipulates that no other conditions other than those mentioned in the document can be made a precondition. Therefore, bringing in a new condition would itself be a violation of the CFA, and the LTTE would be keen to avoid being seen to stall talks.

“Does this mean that the Govt wasn’t interested in rebuilding the NE during the ceasefire or making a deal to share power with the Tamils. The whole point of the ceasefire was to create the conditions for new deals and agreements to be made and implemented. if the govt wasn’t interested, then it’s not surprising that war ensued.”

I’m sure the GoSL was (and is interested), but not necessarily in the same way as the previous administration. That’s obvious. The GoSL didn’t say it wasn’t interested; in fact, it didn’t say much at all, and was criticized for it by observers (including me). In other words they stalled. The LTTE grew impatient and resorted to military/terrorist action. Which was my original point.

“The causal links there are a bit dodge. If the govt didn’t respond militarily how did things get substantially worse for the Tamils in the NE compared to pre-November ‘03″

Well, for one the SL military began to consolidate its hold on the HSZ, impose local curfews, restrict fishing, etc whenever there was an LTTE attack. This was a direct result of specific attacks. This brought grumbling by the population against both the GoSL and the LTTE. From the LTTE side, there was little attempt by them to release land and property comandeered before the CFA, and this was something that upset many Tamils who had expected a return to normalcy.

“I’ve told you that the LTTE for the first time laid down non-negotiable conditions that the govt was not inclined to accept after the Karuna split”

Agreed; and if taken alone might indicate that it was the GoSL’s refusal to abide by an LTTE request that led to fighting. But it can’t be taken alone. Account has to be taken of the escalation that led upto the split and the GoSL’s subsequent support for the TMVP.

“So the LTTE stepped up the violence between Nov 03 and March 04(when karuna defected). How did you come to this conclusion”

Aadhavan, I never said the above. I said that the LTTE grew impatient with the peace process, and returned to violence. You (or someone else here) suggested that they were justified in doing so because the GoSL rejected the ISGA.

“So even by your own test, Karuna has to “win” the “popular war” – whatever you mean by “popular war”. Has Karuna won any war?”

Is the war over? No one has won anything yet. I thought you were aware of what a popular war is when you rejected the “fish in the sea” theory. I stand corrected. A popular war is a war that is fought for control of a mutually shared population.

“t’s much easier to ascribe the military success of Karuna+army to the fact that the army now has in addition to their potent weapons and superior numbers, a group of guys who know the enemy like the back of their hand. ”

This is true enough when analysing the overall military success in the East. For the TMVP to survive, however, it needs popular support.

“You didn’t respond to my argument that you do not need to account for either Karuna’s size or ability by having recourse to the explanation of popular support.”

Are you asking me if size matters if you have popular support? If not, can you rephrase?

“You only say you need popular support to win a war.”

I did NOT say this, Aadhavan. I’ve made it abundantly clear that popular support is an indispensable, but not the ONLY one. I even put it down as an equation (safe haven + popular support = success). It really is tiresome to have to repeat myself because you skip portions of the post. There are other indispensables, like fighting capability, manpower, communications, but these are secondary.

“That refrain really doesn’t address the specific situation here, given that it seems like Karuna has tipped the balance in the govt’s favour, and not “won the war”.”

Again, not too sure what you mean here, given that the war’s not over yet.

“Again your examples only prove that it’s difficult for a major military power to rout a smaller group with tremendous popular support. The major military power here is the army and Karuna is under their wing, so what’s your point?”

My point is that popular support is vital.

“That’s just a circular argument right. Your only evidence of people rallying under the flag is the fact that the Karuna split based on that flag. When I tell you that the flag(specific oppression) doesn’t exist and so the split must have been due to some other reason, you say that people have rallied under that flag!”

No, I’m saying that the TMVP has popular support, and since the TMVP’s flag is freedom from LTTE oppression (as well as self-governance for the Eastern Tamils), that support has to be directly related to the flag or cause.

“Well you were the one who initially claimed that the split was not govt instigated, it was the result of the LTTE’s oppression. It seemed to me like the attributing of one answer excluded the other. Now it turns out that the oppression was one of the factors that made the split possible. I can name a few other factors that also caused the split -”

I’m sure that there are other factors, Aadhavan. I didn’t say oppression was the ONLY factor, but without that oppression there would be no credible flag to rally under. It is a contributing factor, not a central cause, but a factor of such major proportions that it would have been impossible for Karuna to revolt without it. It was a cause that he knew people would rally to.

“Under your thesis, it is still possible that the SL govt or India instigated it right.”

Anything’s possible, to use a phrase you seem to enjoy, “there isn’t a shred of evidence”.

“That’s just a cop out. I don’t know about sites, but i’m fairly sure that if the LTTE was oppressive to a massive portion of the people under its control, there would have been more than a few people who would have raised the issue, especially if the people recognized such oppression. The absence of even a murmur suggests that this oppression really didn’t exist.”

Would you consider this a murmur? It’s a small quote. the full document’s pretty lengthy and quotes Tamil sources.

“The LTTE routinely used excessive force in the war, including by targeting civilians. Since the peace process began in December 2001, the LTTE has engaged in kidnapping, hijackings of truck shipments, and forcible recruitment, including of children. The LTTE was widely believed by credible sources to have increased its recruitment during the year. There were intermittent reports of children ranging in age from 13 to 17 escaping from LTTE camps. During the year, the LTTE released 141 children. (see Sections 1.f. and 5.). The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) received approximately 200 complaints about child abductions during the year, and credible sources said those children were recruited to be child soldiers. Senior LTTE officials alleged to foreign officials that child soldiers were volunteers. During the year, the LTTE and UNICEF reached an agreement on the demobilization and rehabilitation of child soldiers and began work on an action plan to address issues relating to child labor, including underage recruitment. However, the LTTE provided little follow-up to the plan.” –The US Sate Department Human Right Practices 2003 Report (http://www.sinhaya.com/US%20HR%20report%202003.htm)

That’s why I asked you if you denied that the LTTE oppresses the Tamils. I can’t find your answer anywhere.

“Probably not right, given that the govt needed Karuna only to attack the LTTE. In any case, if the govt didn’t want to make deals. then this could never have happened.”

No, the GoSL needs Karuna & the TMVP for the same reason that India needs J&K: to be able to legitimately say that they are a pluralistic entity fighting for the rights of ALL of the population. The TMVP gives credence to the idea that not all Tamils favour the LTTE/terrorism, and therefore this isn’t an ethnic war. Of course the LTTE would have achieved this. Not even the most optimistic GoSL official believes the war can be won militarily. Eventually negotiations have to be made. Military activity is to gain an upper hand at that table. And the GoSl would eventually have dealt, but it waas haggling. The LTTE should’ve played along.

“Yeah, they’d have to cede control. If there are however political problems with giving away an entire Province to a former LTTE cadre and Tamil militant, then there’d be a bit of a problem. The unitarists won’t be happy, why don’t you ask a few of them about it?”

I have actually. You’d be surprised at the attitude towards Karuna. A murderous terrorist is now considered “apey kollek”. It’s a savinng of face. Anyone but Prabakharan, seems to be the motto. As for Karuna not settling for less, I think he knows which side his bread is buttered. He’s a pragmatist, if nothing else. He made his stake before the old guard of the LTTE died off and left room open for the new guard to squabble. And that will come once Prabha dies. So while Tamilselvam & co fight over the LTTE, the TMVP will already have a fair amount of established power.

“The critical question is whether the Sinhalese majority are willing to grant control of Tamil areas to Tamils and share power without pulling the strings. ”

We can only wait and see.

“Therefore, if you’re saying it’s logical that the LTTE would inform the GoSL of a new condition, that logic doesn’t apply.”

Well, the LTTE had a very clear policy on the ISGA. This “mysterious undeclared condition” theory is just ridiculous. There’s not a shred to support it and it’s highly unlikely that any negotiator imposes conditions for negotiation on the other side without even informing them of the existence of those conditions. It goes against the logic of what a condition is. Even if it is possible that negotiators have mysterious undeclared conditions, how do you know that the LTTE imposed ISGA as a condition.

You said “the GoSL was happy to maintain the status quo; and part of that status quo was not acceding to new agreements or deals” and “I’m sure the GoSL was (and is interested), but not necessarily in the same way as the previous administration” and ”

Make up your mind. Were they or were they not interested in making new deals or agreements. If not in the same way, in what way?

Mate, here’s another contradiction for you – You said

“So they rejected the ISGA, the LTTE was miffed and began to use military pressure. That didn’t work, and in fact just made things worse for the Tamil population.”

…then I said

“So the LTTE stepped up the violence between Nov 03 and March 04(when karuna defected). How did you come to this conclusion”
(the isga proposals were released Nov 03)

and in reply to my comment you said contradicting yourself…

“Aadhavan, I never said the above. I said that the LTTE grew impatient with the peace process, and returned to violence. You (or someone else here) suggested that they were justified in doing so because the GoSL rejected the ISGA.”

…so now you’re trying to wriggle out of proving a direct connection between the ISGA rejection and the violence. However, in earlier comments on this thread also you said(in a reply to Sophist)

“If you’re going to say “Here’s my plan, if you don’t like it, we’ll start shooting”, then that’s just plain terrorism, and no state is going to be held hostage in that manner. There were many things the LTTE could have done — bargained with a second proposal, asked for a GoSL counter proposal, opened up a propoganda war. Instead, they chose military action.”

I think it’s fairly clear your initial position was that the LTTE stepped up the violence because the ISGA was rejected. Then you reject that you said it. Oh well….

“Account has to be taken of the escalation that led upto the split and the GoSL’s subsequent support for the TMVP”

Again I ask you, what are the incidents that constituted this escalation. They were sporadic incidents, and there weren’t many in 2003. You haven’t answered this yet.

“For the TMVP to survive, however, it needs popular support.”

But no, the only reason Karuna survives is that the army protects it. It is small, which means that they didn’t have to do a hell of a lot of recruiting of the locals that might indicate popular support, nor do they possess territory adversely to the LTTE which is difficult without popular support or the sheer might of military force and admin capacity that the GOSL has. You really haven’t shown any reason why in the specific instance Karuna needs popular support to survive, whereas I’ve sown you why a group like karuna’s does not need popular support to do the things he has done so far.

“Would you consider this a murmur? It’s a small quote.”

You’re more intelligent than this. I was talking about murmurs about about specific oppression against the Eastern Tamils no David. There are probably entire books written about claims that the LTTE is oppressive in general, but that’s not the issue in dispute.

“No, I’m saying that the TMVP has popular support, and since the TMVP’s flag is freedom from LTTE oppression (as well as self-governance for the Eastern Tamils), that support has to be directly related to the flag or cause.”

But the problem you have is that in trying to prove that that the TMVP has popular support. Even if we keep that issue aside, the TMVP’s flag was “oppression of Eastern Tamils by Northern Tamil dominated LTTE” so your thesis assumes that there was popular support for such a flag. Yet, you are unable to show that this was even raised as an issue preKaruna by anyone, anywhere, at any moment in time- let alone demonstrate that such oppression exists.

You’re struggling to prove each of those causal links independently – that Karuna has popular support, that you have to invoke popular support to explain the existence of Karuna, that there was oppression specifically directed against Eastern Tamils by the LTTE.

I said – “Under your thesis, it is still possible that the SL govt or India instigated it right.”
You said – “Anything’s possible, to use a phrase you seem to enjoy, “there isn’t a shred of evidence”
so maybe you’d like to rephrase the comment you made earlier – “And remember that the TMVP split off wasn’t instigated by the GoSL” to “I don’t know whether the TMVP split was instigated by the GoSL”

“You’d be surprised at the attitude towards Karuna.”

Many see him as a pawn, therefore an “apey kolla”. When the “apey kolla” wants to lord it over you though, and control the east he might not be viewed with as much love and tenderness. That’s why i say it all depends on whether the Sinhalese majority are willing to share power with the Tamils. If they are not, they will not let Karuna control the East, and this could be a big big problem.

If you take the constitutional angle, none of the powers within the framework of the 13th amendment are really substantial. Even the Governor, head of the executive can be stripped of his power by the President at any time. So if you really want a position that would really allow someone to control a Province, you have to change the Constitution… and allow federalism. Again, will the majority allow this?

OK, let me reiterate my position, since you’ve quoted me largely out of context, which is admittedly confusing. I said originally that the LTTE grew impatient with the peace process and resorted to adding pressure through military/terrorist action. My comments about the ISGA were in response to specific statements about it (as with Sophist). I didn’t say that everything was a result of the ISGA rejection. Sophist contended that the GoSL was at fault for rejecting the ISGA, and that the LTTE was basically justified in returning to arms. I didn’t put forward the theory that they had; I simply said that rejection of the ISGA wasn’t an excuse to return to arms. That it was tantamount to blackmail, etc. Hope that’s cleared up any misunderstandings.

Since you seem to allude that there was no real terrorism by the LTTE until Karuna’s split, I’ll give you a few figures. I haven’t direct access to newspaper archives to give you a detailed breakdown of killings and other terrorist acts, but I’ll give you some general stats and some concluding analysis. If you feel that is insufficient, I’ll have to let it go.

Between the April 2003 (when the LTTE suspended further negotiations with the GoSL) to the end of that year, there were 127 politically motivated killings (almost one every three days), of which 36 were Army agents. In addition, according to Amnesty International, there were 16 killings even during the talks. I find this rate of assassination would’ve put serious pressure on the peace process. Many analysts agree:

“However, the the numerous political assassinations and killings by the LTTE that continued throughout the ceasefire cast a shadow on the prospects for peace and on the motives of the LTTE.”
–Rohan Gunaratne (Introduction: change and continuity in The Changing Face of Terrorism by Rohan
Gunaratna ed. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International p. 9), talking of the period pre-Karuna.

“You said “the GoSL was happy to maintain the status quo; and part of that status quo was not acceding to new agreements or deals” and “I’m sure the GoSL was (and is interested), but not necessarily in the same way as the previous administration” and ”

Make up your mind. Were they or were they not interested in making new deals or agreements. If not in the same way, in what way?”

Again, you’ve misread or misunderrstood the second of my above statements, Aadhavan. You asked me if the GoSL wasn’t interested in reconstructing and developing the NE, not whether it was intersted in making deals. The first statement deals with deals, the second with reconstruction. They are not contradictory cos they were in response to two different questions. The GoSL probably sees reconstruction as somethhing it would rather do instead of channelling funds through the LTTE.

“the only reason Karuna survives is that the army protects it.”

That’s conjecture, Aadhavan. You’ve already made up your mind that the TMVP has no popular support, and so you conclude that the only way it can survive is through GoSL protection. I can only tell you once more that no PF group can survive without popular support. I have pointed out historical examples. If you feel that your theory makes more sense than the overwhelming historical evidence, good for you. I can only show you the evidence, I can’t make you believe. I can tell you that a fish cannot survive out of water. If you think othrwise, oh well…

“You really haven’t shown any reason why in the specific instance Karuna needs popular support to survive, ”

OK, I’ll indulge you. The TMVP conducts military ops in areas populated by Tamils. In order for it to succeed, it needs these people. A good example of why a force that is externally propped up but has no popular support (I’ve given you many already, but never mind) was the ARVN in South Vietnam; they were Vietnamese, operating in “govt territory” amongst Vietnamese. No support, no success. Another are the Cuban exiles. Safe, haven, plenty opf money, no support. There are literally hundreds of examples of small forces with havens and support, that have eventually been defeated when the haven was taken away too. The Mogntanards in Vietnam, the anti-Communist Tibetens. The former were very successful against the NVA and the VC (larger guerrilla groups, in paraallel with the LTTE within the environment) because they had safe havens and popular support. Once the US withdrew from Vietnam and Laos, the Mogntanards were defeaated. Same with the Tibetans once they lost their Indian bases. Karuna can still be defeated, but only if the GoSL withdraws support OR he loses popular support. Neither ONE is sufficient to sustain him. He MUST have both. That’s just the military side. If he wants to establish himself with a political powerbase, he needs thaat support even more.

“whereas I’ve sown you why a group like karuna’s does not need popular support to do the things he has done so far.”

No, you haven’t. I challenge you to present a single historical incident of a PF/guerrilla group that has succeeded without popular support. “The things Karuna does” is what you think he does (or the LTTE says he does), not what he does.

“t is small, which means that they didn’t have to do a hell of a lot of recruiting of the locals that might indicate popular support”

It maybe small in relation to the LTTE, but the accusations of child recruitment show that he’s recruiting indeed. So if you’re saying that a lack of recruits indicates lack of popularity, you’re wrong there too.

“You’re more intelligent than this. I was talking about murmurs about about specific oppression against the Eastern Tamils no David. There are probably entire books written about claims that the LTTE is oppressive in general, but that’s not the issue in dispute.”

Actually it is. To repeat (once more), my original take on it was that oppression of the Tamils made it possible for the TMVP to split away. I already said I had no “evidence” beyond anecdotes. I also said that I’m not adamently insisting that extra oppression of the Tamils exist. But the fact that the TMVP has popular support indicates that they believe Karuna. It’s quite possible that Karuna exaggerated the claims of oppression by the LTTE to garner popular support (just as the LTTE exaggerated claims of Sinhalese oppression). But without the LTTE oppression of the Tamils, this would not be possible. OK?

“I said – “Under your thesis, it is still possible that the SL govt or India instigated it right.”
You said – “Anything’s possible, to use a phrase you seem to enjoy, “there isn’t a shred of evidence”
so maybe you’d like to rephrase the comment you made earlier – “And remember that the TMVP split off wasn’t instigated by the GoSL” to “I don’t know whether the TMVP split was instigated by the GoSL””

I can also say that I don’t know whether there are little green men on Mars; it is possible, but there isn’t a shred of evidence, so I will say that there probably aren’t any. I can also say that I don’t know whether Prabha & Co are a bunch of homosexuals; it IS possible, but since there isn’t any evidence, it’s probably untrue.

“Many see him as a pawn, therefore an “apey kolla”. When the “apey kolla” wants to lord it over you though, and control the east he might not be viewed with as much love and tenderness.”

Again, conjecture. He isn’t lording anything at the moment, and I think he’ll be smart enough not to do that. He’ll expect certain favours from the GoSL for his current support, and I’m sure he’ll get it.

“That’s why i say it all depends on whether the Sinhalese majority are willing to share power with the Tamils. If they are not, they will not let Karuna control the East, and this could be a big big problem.”

It could be, yes, but as I said, Karuna’s more than likely to have learned from Prabha’s mistakes. There’ll be plenty of Muslims in his corner.

“en the Governor, head of the executive can be stripped of his power by the President at any time. So if you really want a position that would really allow someone to control a Province, you have to change the Constitution… and allow federalism. Again, will the majority allow this?”

Sure, that’s all a long way down the road, and it’ll depend on the TMVP’s behaviour over the next months and even years. The whole federal question hasn’t been resolved yet, administrations change, etc. So it’s hard to say. If you expect me to give you a “happily ever after” ending, or even predict the future, I can’t. But I think this is the GoSL’s most likely route.

“I didn’t say that everything was a result of the ISGA rejection.”

Oh really? Then why did you say this : “So they rejected the ISGA, the LTTE was miffed and began to use military pressure.”

See that Blacker – “began”. Even if you ignore the word began it’s abundantly clear that you posited that the rejection of the ISGA was linked to the spike in the violence. If you think you didn’t mean it, that’s all right, I’ll take your word.

“Since you seem to allude that there was no real terrorism by the LTTE until Karuna’s split.”

I said there were acts of violence before the split, however that violence did not mean inevitable war.

“Between the April 2003 (when the LTTE suspended further negotiations with the GoSL) to the end of that year, there were 127 politically motivated killings (almost one every three days), of which 36 were Army agents.”

Were all of these killings perpetrated by the LTTE? Generally, this type of political killing is of the tit for tat variety. You kill my informer, I’ll kill yours.

Re the Rohan Gunaratne quote, it’s entirely possible that there was considerable pessimism among the Sinhalese of the LTTE’s bona fides and there could have been a shadow cast over the talks. That doesn’t take away from the fact that the fate of peace was inevitably doomed when the govt decided o help Karuna and accept Karuna’s help in attacking the LTTE.

“You asked me if the GoSL wasn’t interested in reconstructing and developing the NE, not whether it was intersted in making deals. The first statement deals with deals, the second with reconstruction.”

That’s not true. I asked you about reconstruction + deals

“Does this mean that the Govt wasn’t interested in rebuilding the NE during the ceasefire or making a deal to share power with the Tamils.” See that David, reconstruction + deals. So tell me, is the govt interested or not interested in making deals?

I said – “You really haven’t shown any reason why in the specific instance Karuna needs popular support to survive, ” and you replied “OK, I’ll indulge you. The TMVP conducts military ops in areas populated by Tamils. In order for it to succeed, it needs these people.”

I think you’re confusing between survival and success. Does a militant paramilitary group need popular support to survive or to succeed. It’s not clear yet. Either way, while your examples are interesting, they do not show why popular support is required for a small paramilitary to survive within areas controlled by the dominant military power on the ground. That’s why I said it’s significant that the GoSL protects Karuna in territory controlled by it. They do not therefore, need the locals support since the dominant military power provides that. That’s why the EPDP survive in certain areas of the North.

On whether success requires popular support, I have suggested that the contribution of Karuna to the army in terms of military intelligence and familiarity with the area gives the alliance a massive advantage, explaining the recent successes. If there was a parity in military power in the East, the Karuna defection has shifted the balance.

On the operations by Karuna in LTTE controlled areas, the Deep penetration squads have been doing it for years with little public support, so why would Karuna need popular support. He’s probably better at the job than the army chaps because of his background, but popular support is still not essential.

“I can also say that I don’t know whether there are little green men on Mars; it is possible, but there isn’t a shred of evidence, so I will say that there probably aren’t any.”

Is that even an argument? You know that the absence of evidence isn’t the evidence of absence. If you substitute “little green men on mars” with “other forms of life in the Universe” it becomes apparent that just because you don’t have evidence of something doesn’t mean it’s ridiculous. It’s question of likelihood. I would say that given the fact that Karuna and the army are working together it’s a possibility that the GoSL instigated the split. I don’t have evidence of it and neither will I claim it. You however, claimed the GoSL didn’t instigate, so it’s your burden to show that’s it’s not possible that the Govt instigated it.

“He isn’t lording anything at the moment, and I think he’ll be smart enough not to do that.”

Maybe you didn’t hear about the Karuna-Muslim clashes in Kattankudy and Arayampathy.

Damn, I never thought I’d miss Sittingnut until I actually found his alter ego!

“Oh really? Then why did you say this”

OK, I shouldn’t have used the word “began”. And I didn’t mean the violence started with the ISGA (thought I’d explained that in the last post). The violence started when the LTTE grew impatient with the peace process and GoSL stalling.

“Were all of these killings perpetrated by the LTTE?”

Yes.

“Re the Rohan Gunaratne quote, it’s entirely possible that there was considerable pessimism among the Sinhalese”

If you want to analyse Gunaratne’s analysis, go ahead. While I respect his, I’m afraid I can’t base any theories on yours, Aadhavan. I’ll have to rely on his. His analysis has been, in the past, quite objective and removed from short-term trends of thought.

“So tell me, is the govt interested or not interested in making deals?”

I’m sure the GoSL knows that it will eventually have to make a deal with the LTTE. But in its own good time. It certainly wasn’t interested in dealing over the ISGA, nor continuing the former administration’s policies.

“I think you’re confusing between survival and success. ”

Not at all. I’m talking about a guerrilla/PF group, not a political en tity like the EPDP. In the latter’s case, all it needs to do to survive, is exist somewherre in SL. With the TMVP, which hopes to have a leading role in the East, survival is directly linked to military success. And for that success, it needs popular support. Yes, its insights into the LTTE does give it an edge, and lends that edge to the GoSL (which btw isn’t the sole reason for the latter’s success), contributing to the overall military success. Maybe for you to understand my point, you have to understand what the TMVP’s position is in the East. Is it just a Tamil-speaking unit of the GoSL (like the Kit Carsons were in Vietnam, or the Firqats were in Oman), an auxiliary or paramilitary? They are obviously more than that. So are they a separate entity from the GoSL, like the EPDP? Again, no. So what are they? I think they can be best (though not perfectly) described as an ally with common goals as the GoSL, but not only these goals. To achieve these separate goals (some of which are political, others military, they need to have popular support).

“Either way, while your examples are interesting, they do not show why popular support is required for a small paramilitary to survive within areas controlled by the dominant military power on the ground. ”

As I said, the TMVP isn’t an auxiliary or a paramilitary of the GoSL. I have given you examples of why a military force, large or small, supported by a dominant military presence, and operating in that dominant military’s territory still cannot succeed without popular support (ARVN in South Vietnam, the Protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland).

“I have suggested that the contribution of Karuna to the army in terms of military intelligence and familiarity with the area gives the alliance a massive advantage, explaining the recent successes. ”

I wouldn’t say they give the GoSL a ‘massive’ advantage. They do give them an edge. That edge wouldn’t be sufficient to give victory without the new SLAF close support doctrine or the recent better use of special forces.

“If there was a parity in military power in the East, the Karuna defection has shifted the balance.”

That’s why I said in the first place that the TMVP split off did irrepairable damage to the LTTE. However, it’s no longer possible to judge whether the TMVP would have been enough to tip the balance if the new military doctrine hadn’t come into use. They both happened with this administration, so it’s hard to tell.

“On the operations by Karuna in LTTE controlled areas, the Deep penetration squads have been doing it for years with little public support,”

And with very little real success. This is one of the areas that we can actually see a drastic change in GoSL fortunes since the TMVP appearance. Where the TMVP has been most successful, in fact, is in LTTE territory.

” You know that the absence of evidence isn’t the evidence of absence. If you substitute “little green men on mars” with “other forms of life in the Universe” it becomes apparent that just because you don’t have evidence of something doesn’t mean it’s ridiculous. ”

I didn’t say it was ridiculous; I said that there was no evidence. None whatsoever. You claimed that LTTE oppression of the Eastern Tamils doesn’t exist because there’s no evidence of it. I’m saying the same about your allusion on GoSL instigation.

“It’s question of likelihood. I would say that given the fact that Karuna and the army are working together it’s a possibility that the GoSL instigated the split. ”

That’s an amazing jump to conclusion even for SL, Aadhaavan! And as I said, it’s possible, but there’s no evidence. I might say (looking at likelihood), that since the LTTE interfered with police operations to arrest a foreign paedophile, that Prabha likes little boys. It is possible, but there’s no evidence. We could keep this up all day, you know.

“You however, claimed the GoSL didn’t instigate, so it’s your burden to show that’s it’s not possible that the Govt instigated it.”

What burden? Look, the glass is empty; there’s no water in it. Can you see water? Neither can I. Guess there isn’t any. There, that wasn’t very burdensome was it?

“Maybe you didn’t hear about the Karuna-Muslim clashes in Kattankudy and Arayampathy.”

Oh, there’ve been Tamil-Muslim clashes in the East for fifty years, mostly over land. I remember cycling through the outskirts of Batti somewhere around ’95, and this Tamil girl I was with told me we had to take a detour around a Muslim area because it wasn’t safe for Tamils to go through.

“Damn, I never thought I’d miss Sittingnut until I actually found his alter ego!”

Not a very elegant way to wriggle out of explaining some blatantly contradictory comments.

“And I didn’t mean the violence started with the ISGA (thought I’d explained that in the last post)”

No, you only tried to explain your comments to Sophist. You did not explain the “began” quote which was in this very same “conversation”- is that the word?

“If you want to analyse Gunaratne’s analysis, go ahead. While I respect his, I’m afraid I can’t base any theories on yours, Aadhavan. I’ll have to rely on his. His analysis has been, in the past, quite objective and removed from short-term trends of thought.”

I wasn’t even casting any aspersions on his good name. Why do you get so defensive? I was merely telling you that I understand his comments to be very compatible with my position.

“I’m sure the GoSL knows that it will eventually have to make a deal with the LTTE. But in its own good time. It certainly wasn’t interested in dealing over the ISGA, nor continuing the former administration’s policies.”

This beats the other wriggleoutofmyowncontradiction for elegance by a fair bit. Very clever.

“I’m talking about a guerrilla/PF group, not a political en tity like the EPDP. In the latter’s case, all it needs to do to survive, is exist somewherre in SL.”

For an ex soldier, your knowledge is a little sketchy. The EPDP maintains armed cadres in the North, with a strong presence in the islands. Who do you think the paramilitary clause in the CFA was aimed at?

“So what are they? I think they can be best (though not perfectly) described as an ally with common goals as the GoSL, but not only these goals. To achieve these separate goals (some of which are political, others military, they need to have popular support)”

The question is whether these separate goals have been achieved. Tell me where the TMVP have regularly achieved goals that are ‘separate’ to the GoSL’s goals. The test should really be whether any part of their activity or operations are contingent on public support. You have only shown that they have ops in the LTTE controlled area and that they are more successful than the Deep Penetration guys. I told you that ops have always been carried out by the army. The increased success can easily be explained as being due to the superior military intelligence and a familiarity with the ways of the Tigers etc. No necessity for public support.

“I didn’t say it was ridiculous; I said that there was no evidence. None whatsoever.”

Actually this is what you said earlier : “And remember that the TMVP split off wasn’t instigated by the GoSL. It was a result of the LTTE’s opppression of its own people.”

Methinks there’s a big difference between saying “it doesn’t exist” and “there’s no evidence” In any case, as a writer, don’t you think that quote kind of suggests some mutual exclusivity between the two options?

“You claimed that LTTE oppression of the Eastern Tamils doesn’t exist because there’s no evidence of it.”

No, you’re confusing yourself again David. I posited the “lack of a murmur” argument as positive proof of the non existence of such oppression, given the assumption that systematic oppression by a violent outfit would not go under the radar. Even if, for arguments sake, you discount this positive proof, you remain the one who claimed specific oppression in the first place, although you did not “insist” it exists. I would say the lack of evidence precludes you from making the claim, although it does not logically preclude the possibility of its truth.

You claimed that the GoSL did not instigate the split and that the LTTE oppressed Eastern Tamils. Your burden David.

I said “It’s question of likelihood. I would say that given the fact that Karuna and the army are working together it’s a possibility that the GoSL instigated the split. ” and you replied “That’s an amazing jump to conclusion even for SL, Aadhaavan! And as I said, it’s possible, but there’s no evidence. I might say (looking at likelihood), that since the LTTE interfered with police operations to arrest a foreign paedophile, that Prabha likes little boys. It is possible, but there’s no evidence. We could keep this up all day, you know.”

I didn’t claim the Govt instigated the split. I said it was possible, hence no burden of proof on me to prove anything. If I were to claim that Prabha does not like young boys, I would have to give good reasons that it’s unlikely. Saying there’s no evidence wouldn’t cut.

“What burden? Look, the glass is empty; there’s no water in it. Can you see water? Neither can I. Guess there isn’t any. There, that wasn’t very burdensome was it?”

Wrong analogy. The proper analogy would be to say that neither of us can see the glass but one claims the glass is empty. There’s no evidence that there’s water in the glass, but this is not evidence that the glass is empty.

In your analogy there’s positive proof that the glass is empty David. You observe its emptiness. Is this too burdensome?

“Oh, there’ve been Tamil-Muslim clashes in the East for fifty years, mostly over land.”

Yes there have. The point is that Karuna’s cadres attacked the Muslims in Kattankudy and things came to a halt when the army intervened. The problem’s will occur when Karuna is too powerful for the army to intervene, i.e- control has been handed over. The incident also highlights that Karuna hasn’t got out of the mindset he had when he was Eastern Commander of the LTTE which was to use the ethnic tensions between the communities for political benefit.

“No, you only tried to explain your comments to Sophist. You did not explain the “began” quote which was in this very same “conversation”- is that the word?”

Come on, Aadhavan, I have made my position clear and said that I did NOT mean that the violence started with the ISGA. I see little point in us debating the meanings of what each of us have said. Do you need further clarification of my position?

“I wasn’t even casting any aspersions on his good name. Why do you get so defensive? I was merely telling you that I understand his comments to be very compatible with my position.”

Didn’t say you were casting aspersions. What you did, however, was try to explain away his analysis as pessimism. I then explained to you why I tend to accept his analysis rather than your analysis of his analysis. If you agree with him that “the numerous political assassinations and killings by the LTTE that continued throughout the ceasefire cast a shadow on the prospects for peace”, I’m glad to hear it.

“This beats the other wriggleoutofmyowncontradiction for elegance by a fair bit. Very clever.”

Again, I thought you wanted an answer to your question, rather than rhetoric. Isn’t it more straightforward to clarify issues when asked rather than intentionally muddy the waters by going back and quoting and requoting statements that have been misunderstood?

“For an ex soldier, your knowledge is a little sketchy. The EPDP maintains armed cadres in the North, with a strong presence in the islands. Who do you think the paramilitary clause in the CFA was aimed at?”

Actually, Aadhavan, you’ve consistently proven that it’s your military knowledge that is sketchy. Do you know the difference between maintaining a few hundred armed cadres and operating a guerrilla/PF group? It’s sort of like comparing bank security guards to the Army. When was the last time the EPDP carried out combat ops against the LTTE? The paramilitary clause certainly was aimed at the EPDP, but the TMVP is much more than a paramilitary.

“The question is whether these separate goals have been achieved. Tell me where the TMVP have regularly achieved goals that are ’separate’ to the GoSL’s goals.”

They’ve not been around long enough for this to be clear, I think, and since we are discussing an ongoing scenario, it’s to early to say. But I don’t think it’s unrealistic to expect this to happen soon. There are hints of this, though, in the clashes with the Muslims,, which you yourself point out.

” The test should really be whether any part of their activity or operations are contingent on public support.”

As I already said, most of their activities are in line with a guerrilla/PF group, and for me to explain all of the areas where unconventional warfare requires popular support would just be impossible in a blog. I can provide you with a bibilography if you’re interested though.

“The increased success can easily be explained as being due to the superior military intelligence and a familiarity with the ways of the Tigers etc. No necessity for public support.”

Superior military intelligence comes with popular support. Where do you think that intelligence is gathered from, other than the population? And deep penetration ops aren’t just about lying in the jungle and watching a road, but also about gathering intelligence in enemy territory. This also comes with a certain amount of contact with the civil populace. Such contact is not possible if the populace is hostile to the LRRPs. That’s why the US LRRPS in Vietnam and the Brit SAS in Northern Ireland weren’t that successful, while the SAS in Borneo was.

[“I didn’t say it was ridiculous; I said that there was no evidence. None whatsoever.”

Actually this is what you said earlier : “And remember that the TMVP split off wasn’t instigated by the GoSL. It was a result of the LTTE’s opppression of its own people.”

Methinks there’s a big difference between saying “it doesn’t exist” and “there’s no evidence” In any case, as a writer, don’t you think that quote kind of suggests some mutual exclusivity between the two options?"]

Not at all. Are you saying because I haven’t provided evidence of LTTE oppression, GoSL instigation must therefore be the cause of the split?

“No, you’re confusing yourself again David”

Again, not at all. Though I do think you’re trying to confuse the issue.

“I posited the “lack of a murmur” argument as positive proof of the non existence of such oppression,”

It isn’t positive proof of non-existence. It’s lack of proof of existence. Just as there’s a lack of proof of GoSL instigation of Karuna, green men on Mars and of Prabha’s homosexuality. If you think it is likely that such instigation happened, simply because the GoSL is now allied with the TMVP, that is mere speculation, and not backed by evidence, or even the balance of probabilities. Given the fact that the GoSL has never succeeded in penetrating the LTTE or instigating any such revolt in the past, the likelihood doesn’t exist. However, the obvious oppression by the LTTE of the NE Tamils, as well as other minorities, makes the liklihood of extra oppression against the Eastern Tamils possible, and even probable.

” I would say the lack of evidence precludes you from making the claim, ”

As it precludes you from claiming GoSL instigation of the TMVP revolt.

“You claimed that the GoSL did not instigate the split and that the LTTE oppressed Eastern Tamils.”

It is my burden to prove the latter, not the former. I don’t think innocence needs to be proven. If you claim the GoSL is guilty of instigation, its incumbent on you to prove it, not for me to prove you wrong.

“I said it was possible, hence no burden of proof on me to prove anything.”

Exactly. Anything’s possible, green men on Mars, etc.

“Wrong analogy. The proper analogy would be to say that neither of us can see the glass but one claims the glass is empty.”

No, we both can see the glass (the split). You say that the glass has water in it (GoSL instigation). I say there isn’t any water because neither of us can see any (no evidence).

“In your analogy there’s positive proof that the glass is empty David. You observe its emptiness. Is this too burdensome?”

So then we have positive proof of the GoSL’s innocence? You make my burden so light, Aadhavan!

“The point is that Karuna’s cadres attacked the Muslims in Kattankudy and things came to a halt when the army intervened. The problem’s will occur when Karuna is too powerful for the army to intervene, i.e- control has been handed over.”

All that proves is that the Army is willing to intervene. How powerful Karuna is allowed to become is still speculation.

“The incident also highlights that Karuna hasn’t got out of the mindset he had when he was Eastern Commander of the LTTE which was to use the ethnic tensions between the communities for political benefit.”

Possibly. I said at the beginning that I didn’t think he was much better than Prabha. It’s just that the GoSL doesn’t care. He’s a Tiger by a different name. This has its pluses and minuses.

“Come on, Aadhavan, I have made my position clear and said that I did NOT mean that the violence started with the ISGA.”

Do you think the ISGA rejection resulted in the spike in the violence or am I to assume that your amended position is that the ISGA rejection had no perceivable impact on the levels of violence prevailing at the time. I also asked you about whether all those killings were perpetrated by the LTTE, because your quote that accompanied the numbers you cited did not state who the perpetrators were. I hope you’re not drawing this conclusion all by yourself.

“If you agree with him that “the numerous political assassinations and killings by the LTTE that continued throughout the ceasefire cast a shadow on the prospects for peace”, I’m glad to hear it.”

Whether I agree with him or not would be contingent on whether the killings were LTTE perpetrated or of the tit for type variety. What I’m saying is that even if I agree with his comment, it still doesn’t undermine what I have said about the Karuna split and subsequent govt support being the factor that resulted in a situation where war was inevitable.

“Superior military intelligence comes with popular support. Where do you think that intelligence is gathered from, other than the population? And deep penetration ops aren’t just about lying in the jungle and watching a road, but also about gathering intelligence in enemy territory. This also comes with a certain amount of contact with the civil populace. Such contact is not possible if the populace is hostile to the LRRPs.”

Actuall this is the only evidence you have cited of popular support being indispensable to Karuna, so let’s deal with it. I would argue that the superior intelligence in Karuna’s case does not even require popular support because Karuna’s and his cadre’s collective intel on the LTTE must be massive, given that he was the mastermind of the LTTE’s ops in the East and sometimes in the North. He knows the enemy inside out. He does not need popular support to gain this sort of information.

About the deep penetration ops, I pointed out that the army used to do it as well, albeit less successfully. But the LTTE conducts plenty of ops in the south. They’re not exactly popular in these parts. They either force, cajole or bribe someone into helping them and carry on their business despite the lack of popular support. Why couldn’t Karuna do the same thing in LTTE controlled territory?

“I posited the “lack of a murmur” argument as positive proof of the non existence of such oppression,”
“It isn’t positive proof of non-existence. It’s lack of proof of existence. Just as there’s a lack of proof of GoSL instigation of Karuna, green men on Mars and of Prabha’s homosexuality.”

No, you aren’t getting the subtle distinction between the two. I said the “lack of a murmur” was positive proof of non existence because I’m assuming validly that there would have been a murmur if there was specific oppression by a violent, authoritarian armed group against a significant portion of the people under its control. Given the lack of a murmur, I conclude that such oppression does not exist. But i have to assume that given the type of thing that is being alleged, there would have to have been some kind of evidence of a specific kind, and I believe that is a fair assumption. In situations where you cannot assume that there would necessarily be evidence that would easily be perceived, non existence of evidence cannot be proof of absence of what is being alleged does not exist. In terms of Karuna’s defection and govt support, the lack of evidence does not necessarily mean that the govt did not instigate the split, unless you can establish that there would be an abundance of a certain type of evidence if the govt in fact did instigate, and therefore the non existence of such evidence is evidence that the split was not govt instigated.

“I don’t think innocence needs to be proven. If you claim the GoSL is guilty of instigation, its incumbent on you to prove it, not for me to prove you wrong.”

But this is not a court room where the legal doctrine of the presumption of innocence would apply. It’s pure fact and logic. You claim something, you prove it. You claim govt did not instigate, come up with something better than there’s no evidence. I on the other hand, did not claim govt instigation, so I don’t need to prove that the govt instigated, but can sit on the sidelines and comment that as long as there’s no evidence, it’s an open question and a possibility.

As to your point that the possibility is the same as there being green men on the moon, I would point out that there are varying levels of likelihood. What’s the likelihood of other forms of life existing in the Universe? We don’t have evidence, but it won’t do to say that there is no life on the Universe other than biological life unless there’s no positive proof of its absence.

“No, we both can see the glass (the split). You say that the glass has water in it (GoSL instigation). I say there isn’t any water because neither of us can see any (no evidence).”

Oh, if the glass is the split, then the proper analogy would be that we don’t know what’s in the glass. It’s covered in black or something and there’s no proof that there’s water or whether there’s not. You can’t say that there’s no water in it because you don’t see it. It’s possible there’s water in the glass and it’s possible there isn’t.

By the way, I didn’t claim the split was govt instigated. Don’t want to have to repeat it again. If I did claim the glass has water in it, it wouldn’t do for me to claim that I don’t see the contents, just like it doesn’t do for you to claim that it is empty without seeing that it’s empty.

“In your analogy there’s positive proof that the glass is empty David. You observe its emptiness. Is this too burdensome?”
So then we have positive proof of the GoSL’s innocence? You make my burden so light, Aadhavan!”

It’s not fun to see a grown man struggle with the logic of an analogy but I’ll try and help. In your analogy, the test is whether or not the glass has water in it. That’s the issue right, and if there’s no water, you win. You observe there’s no water, you proved your point. But in your analogy, all the evidence needed to establish the existence or non existence of the cup being empty or otherwise is available to you. This analogy doesn’t work in the instant case (in debating terms it’s called the false analogy) because you’re claiming that the govt did not instigate the split and your proof is that there’s no evidence that they did. The point is that all the evidence necessary to establish rationally whether or not there is govt instigation is not available to you. Given that it’s not available, you cannot prove the absence of such availability as evidence of non existence. Just like you can’t prove that you can’t claim logically that God does not exist based on the non existence of proof that he does exist. You don’t have all the information available to you. That’s why the proper analogy is not being able to see either the cup or its contents. I hope I’ve been of some use. If this doesn’t help pick up any book on popular logic and refer the section on arguing from analogy.

Nice piece of fiction, Jey. Have you got a publisher yet?

Let me ask you a question, Jey. Throughout the ’90s, the Army and STF tried what you’ve suggested has been done with the TMVP; recruuited friendly Tamils and Muslims and banded them together to fight the LTTE (The EPDP, EPRLF, TNA, Razik Group, etc). All of them failed. What is the reason for the TMVP’s overwhelming success if it’s more of the same? I think it’s because it’s a full-fledged former LTTE unit, run and commanded by former LTTEers in the same style as the LTTE, together with popular support and GoSL backing.

Sure, I’d be the first to admit that our Tigers are no better than their Tigers. But then neither are the EPRLF, TELO, and whatever other former separatist/terrorist/militant groups that now oppose the LTTE. And I’ll also admit that the GoSL is playing with fire when it supports the TMVP. However the split in the Tiger ranks was a heaven-sent opportunuty to change the strategic balance, and the GoSL grabbed it with both hands before it disappeared. The damage done to the LTTE by the split (both moral and physical) was so heavy that it’s debatable if it’ll ever fully recover from that loss of position as the champion of the Tamils.

As long as the TMVP is so heavily dependent on the GoSL, the latter can stamp its will on the group, and direct enough pressure to ensure that elections are reasonably fair (by SL standards). I also don’t see the GoSL abandoning the other Tamil and Muslim parties in favour of the TMVP. The bottom line is that the TMVP can be squashed between the GoSL and the LTTE as easily as the old Tamil National Army (TNA) was in ’89, and Karuna knows it. He’ll toe the line. It’ll also admit it’s not the neatest of solutions, but it’s better than the alternatives.

“The damage done to the LTTE by the split (both moral and physical) was so heavy that it’s debatable if it’ll ever fully recover from that loss of position as the champion of the Tamils.”

We still don’t know the full extent of the military damage, but what do you mean by ‘loss of position of the champions of the Tamils’. If you mean some kind of loss of legitimacy among the Tamils, then actually it works the other way, since all these alternative groups who are under the govt wing today are not really taken seriously by the Tamils. Hon. Minister Devananda for instance.

Your confidence in the army is commendable. The Karuna group are slightly different to other groups though since he is indispensable to the govt’s fortunes in the East. All the other paramilitaries were kind of the ‘side support’ guys, but you yourself have admitted that this guy’s support has been critical to the army’s Eastern operation. He’s also a little more capable as a tactical military commander than the ideological EPRLF I would think. Both India and Premadasa thought that the tigers could be forced to ‘toe the line’. Sadly for premadasa and Gandhi, that didn’t happen. Karuna is Prabha’s prodigy. He’s already indispensable and picking a fight with the Muslims. You do the math.

“We still don’t know the full extent of the military damage,”

We do to a certain extent. The loss of part of the hardcore cadre was one part, forcing the LTTE to recruit women & kids at a far greater rate. The loss of certain elite units could not be remedied at all. The current reversals the LTTE is suffering is a direct result of that damage.

I’ve already responded to your comment on LTTE opponents elsewhere.

I’ve already said that handling the TMVP is like playing with fire and isn’t a perfect solution. Ideally we should get rid of both the LTTE and the TMVP, but we don’t have that option. The Sinhalese willl accept Karuna as a PC minister, and so will the Eastern Tamils. Neither will accept an LTTE candidate.

“The Sinhalese willl accept Karuna as a PC minister, and so will the Eastern Tamils. Neither will accept an LTTE candidate.”

I think the more pertinent question is, will Karuna, who is now indispensable to the fortunes of the army in the East, accept being some insignificant PC Minister. If the Eastern Tamils would accept karuna, they would accept the Tigers also. Greater acceptance of Karuna is predicated on either some oppression of Eastern tamils that you have tacitly admitted did not exist, or that Karuna is less oppressive to Tamils in general- a ridiculous idea given the kind of stuff his chaps are doing these days. Don’t know whether the Muslims will accept Karuna either, or whether Karuna will accept them.

The above response was to David Blacker who said:

“However, the LTTE lost its big opportunity to show the world that it was transforming from aa military/terrorist group into a political/governing party. It should have stuck it out, complained loudly about how a hostile GoSL was sponsoring terror in the East, and allowed the IC to put the pressure on the GoSL. “

Diplomacy takes time, Jey. That’s why I pointed out that the LTTE lost patience and resorted to violence. They’re not entirely unjustified in doing so, but the Tamil population must also realise that they’re paying the price for that impatience. Neither Israel nor the USA got their positions over a short few years. It took decades. Attempting to capture territory like the Israelis is ambitious, but a bit futile if you can’t even hold the territory you have.

Maybe it will be like the Tsunami. The sea went out first before surging in. Coincidentally past LTTE ops were named “Ceaseless Waves”.

I agree that diplomacy is important and necessary. We have to do it at the right time. Hope for the sake of all on the island it happens soon.

I admire your attempt to keep up morale at a time when the Tigers have been humiliated, but as Anton Balasingham said at the CFA signing “Don’t stick to the past”. Is a retaliation by the LTTE the best that you can hope for?

dick head, military genius… did you forget that the LTTE is a gurrila army… maybe the beating that the SLA got in the late 90′s and early 2000′s made you think otherwise…

they will always, ebb and flow with depending on the situtation… they won’t hold land for the sake of holding land…

you dumbfuck…

150,000 GosL forces vs. 5,000 LTTE
what’s taken your boys 25 years to get these few “victories”?

In the late ’90s and early ’00s we had idiots in command of the Army and MoD. Luckily, that’s changed. Btw, what’s taken you so long to get your separate state from a tinpot 3rd World government? But wait, you haven’t even managed that yet, have you. It’s all very well for the LTTE to say its a guerrilla army now that it’s got a butt kicking, but if it wants a separate state it needs to prove it can defend and govern it. Not run away when the Army attacks.

Blacker, like Machiavelli said, the end justifies the means. They have chosen to do it Che’s way. This sends a message to those who think of foreign involvement also. By vacating large areas without loosing men and military assets and then turning that vacated ground into a quagmire, the LTTE are proving the point that they will always keep the initiative and higher troop morale, which are the most important things you need to win a war. Tamils have learnt from the 1987 period and then the 1997 to 1999 Jeyasikurui period that even if the LTTE is pushed to one tiny little camp in the jungles somewhere, they still have the cability and morale to make a dramatic comeback capturing large swathes of land.

In answer to your earlier question Blacker we don’t want to call this retaliation. Every action taken is with the main aim to reclaim the whole of Tamil Eelam land mass from occupying forces. Calling it retaliation is looking at it in a simplistic way. That won’t get anyone anywhere now. Ofcourse in the 80′s and 90′s it would have kept support and morale up but nowadays the LTTE or the Tamil population don’t need that. They have the end goal in mind and have a strong conviction that their money and the last 6 years was not made waste. Guerillas always fight the battle on their own terms.

As I said before, Jey, I admire your optimism when all around you are losing hope.

“Blacker, like Machiavelli said, the end justifies the means.”

I believe Heinrich Himmler said similar things, though I doubt he was pleased with his end.

Yes, the LTTE has frequently recaptured areas once again, but at high cost. And as Julius Caesar said, “A land is not governed that must be perpetually conquored”. So if every few years the LTTE is pushed back to the start line, and then has to fight its way back, only to be once more pushed back, Eelam will never be achieved. The NE will remain an embattled and impoverished province of an average 3rd World nation as far as the foreseeable future. Is that what the Tamils want? To educate and prosper their families in the west, sacrificing nothing to the cause, while their SL brethren suffer with no relief in sight?

Yeah, the northwest coast plus the northeast coast between Elephant Pass and the Trinco area.

Thank you for the encouraagement, but I haven’t the time (nor the inclination) to run my own blog. I do contribute to sites like Moju and Ground Views however, and enjoy the discussions on blogs like this.

I completely disagree with you on this point. Pre-election surveys carried out by the likes of AC Nielsen, Lanka Market Research Bureau and Survey Research Lanka (which are often very accurate in their predictions, especially SRL), have repeatedly shown that the war comes a distant second as a voting priority for the people outside the North and East. The cost of living is of primary concern to the people in the rest of the country, whereas a solution to the ethnic conflict is of primary concern to the people living in the North and East. I was chatting with Pradeep Jeganathan of the International Centre of Ethnic Studies about this last week and he also agrees that it is wrong to say that the Sinhala people voted for war. They didn’t select Mahinda because of his policies on the ethnic conflict, rather they rejected Ranil Wickramsinghe, his namby-pamby image, his Western Province centred development, his trickle-down monetarist economics, his refusal to give out jobs and handouts, his elitist reputation, his anti-farmer subsides stance, AND his policy on the war. Plus, the main reason his grass roots campaign failed was because he had no people to work for him. Why? One reason: he didn’t reward his supporters two years previously by giving out jobs. It’s a multitude of reasons, Aadhavan, why the majority of Sinhalese voted for Mahinda. You can’t pick one reason into it, especially when it goes against the survey evidence.

I’m also certain the Sinhalese didn’t vote for war since Mahinda said his plan was not to go to war. i guess people believed him. But I don’t think it was won because of the ‘empty stomach’ type of voting. A lot of the campaigning by Mahinda was on this ‘get tough with the LTTE stance’. I think that was also the condition for JVP support, that coupled with the LTTE enforced boycott, effectively won Mahinda the election.

Disagree again. A lot more of the campaign was on the economy and the cost of living, and the agrarian based village economy. Most of the Mahinda Chintanaya document is on economic and social policies, not military policies and the campaign was run based on this. The village people in the South don’t really care that much about the war. Colombo does, and the Tamils do, and to us who support the UNP’s policy on the war, it seemed like the biggest difference in policy, but it was not marketed as such. The biggest difference that was marketed was the improvement in the quality of life to the village communities who felt alienated by the Wickramasinghe government.

maintaining status quo leads to option (1).

If you like what the war is doing to the economy of the country, then I guess status quo for an indefinite period works. Sure, the economy of the south is doing better than the economy of the war ravaged north, but are you only competing with the Tamils of the North and East. Even going to India sucks now because the SL Rupee is so weak and those Indian middle class people are loaded compared to our middle classes.

I am not saying it’s a good option. I’m just saying that it is the government’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement.

if slow strangulation is the best alternative to the goverment, it really doesn’t have many options on the table does it…

Strangulation? Whoever said anything about strangulation? Outside the North-East, per capita GDP has been growing at high rates for the last 25 years.

So you think the SL economy is on the mend?

I wouldn’t say it’s on the mend. To mend something it has to be broken in the first place.

Of course. I guess the question of the success or otherwise of the SL economy or any economy is relative. The question is, to what? I’m trying to suggest that the SL economy is a success, only if you think it is relative to the economy of the NE economy, which is just horrible, due to the ravages of war. What I mean by do you think it’s on the mend is, do you think it’s getting better.

It seems to that notwithstanding notwithstanding the average of abt 5-6% GDP growth, the high public debt(which is now more than the GDP), the plummeting rupee, the very high inflation rate and the inevitability that these problems will only get compounded due to the end of the moratorium on the repayment of foreign debt kind of make the suggestion that the SL economy is doing all right a bit of a stretch. Oh, wonder what will happen when Cochin overtakes Colombo as the major port in the South Indian region?

The Sri Lankan economy has proved to be very robust and flexible in the face of threats and nay-sayers before, and I ‘m sure it will again. Your implication that we’re somehow in competition with India in a zero-sum game for econopmic welfare is also mistaken. The rapid growth of India’s economy and its proximity to ours is a strong reason to be positive about our own. While the current policy of military escalation is perhaps unsustainable in the face of the burgeoning budget deficit and planned fiscal expansion projects, the alternative wait-and-see policy certainly works in the government’s benefit.

If current trends are projected into the future, lets say 10-15 years, the public debt will only mount, debt repayment will take up a significant portion of foreign earnings, high import costs will keep growing depleting the little reserves that SL have, the rupee will keep depreciating against all other major currencies and inflation will keep growing at a robust rate. Besides, while the whole country may not be competing with India, Colombo port will be in a zero sum game with Cochin with the Sethu canal coming up. Ships are not in the habit of stopping off for refuelling etc every one or two days.

when you said status quol, did you not mean the current policy of military escalation or an alternative to that policy? If the status quo is unsustainable, that’s kind of my point. Wait and see might be a little dangerous don’t you think? Militarily that is…

No, in reply to Shums’ suggestion that there were only two options – military escalation or negotiate a peaceful solution, I suggested that there is a third in-between policy of doing neither, in other words, maintaining the status quo, the way the government was doing, before the LTTE cottoned on and scuttled the CFA.

As far as the ports thing goes, you’re referring to just one aspect of it. You ignore the Colombo South project which will open up capactity in the port. Competition with Cochin for refuelling can be expected to drive oil prices down and the cost of transport to Colombo down with it. Also, insiders in the industry don’t seem to be too worried about the Sethu canal thing.

Oh ok, so status quo is Wickremasinghe govt status quo. Yeah, that would be ok for the govt I guess, but that policy was unsustainable. You say the LTTE scuttled it, I disagree but either way, it was unsustainable. If you don’t want the LTTE to scuttle things when the govt is dilly dallying without giving the Tamils a decent political solution, then you have to take the LTTE out- militarily.

There can only be one trans shipment hub in the region right. If it’s cheaper and less time consuming to go to Cochin, then ships will go there and we’ll attract only the ships that really have to come here- not the ships in transit that are looking for transshipment services. Well, suffice it to say that some industry leaders are very very worried…

David- on bumping off LK, attacks of this calibre are not carried out overnight. For the record, LK’s mission started approximately 2 years before they finally got the target. I firmly don’t believe that it had anything to do with the rejection of the ISGA nor any other incidents that preceded it.

Even worse then. They planned to kill him regardless of whether the GoSL accommodated the LTTE demands or not. Conversely, even if the mission was begun two years previously, like all military ops, there would have been a trigger for launch. The killer team would have done a final CTR and asked for approval. This was then given.